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ARTISTIC CONTROL AFTER DEATH 
Eva E. Subotnik* 
Abstract: To what extent should authors be able to control what happens to their literary, 
artistic, and musical creations after they die? Viewed through the lens of a number of 
succession law trends, the evidence might suggest that strong control is warranted. The 
decline of the Rule Against Perpetuities and rise of incentive trusts reflect a tightening grip of 
the dead hand. And yet, an unconstrained ability of the dead to determine future uses of 
literature, art, and music is a fundamentally troubling notion. This Article evaluates the 
instructions authors give with respect to their authorial works against the backdrop of the 
laws and policies that govern bequests more generally. In particular, it considers the 
enforceability of attempted artistic control through the imposition of a fiduciary duty. In 
balancing the competing interests, this Article considers the demands of both state trust laws 
and federal copyright policy. In the end, this Article argues that authorial instructions must 
yield to the needs of the living. Such a view requires that, to the greatest extent possible, 
some living person(s) be authorized to decide how works of authorship are used—even if that 
means overriding artistic control by the dead. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“So what’cha what’cha what’cha want, what’cha want?”1 In 2014, 
what Monster Energy Company wanted was to limit its damages for 
using Beastie Boys songs in its “Ruckus in the Rockies” promotional 
video.2 That was not, apparently, what the jury wanted, for it awarded 
the hip-hop group $1.2 million in damages.3 An interesting, if not 
dispositive, aspect of the litigation was what deceased Beastie Boy 
Adam “MCA” Yauch wanted. Yauch, who had died from cancer in 2012 
at the age of forty-seven,4 prescribed in his will that “[n]otwithstanding 
anything to the contrary, in no event may my image or name or any 
music or any artistic property created by me be used for advertising 
                                                     
1. BEASTIE BOYS, SO WHAT’CHA WANT (Capitol Records 1992). 
2. See Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 427–28 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
3. Id. at 435. 
4. RJ Cubarrubia, Adam Yauch’s Will Prohibits Use of His Music in Ads, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 
9, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/adam-yauchs-will-prohibits-use-of-his-music-in-
ads-20120809 [https://perma.cc/SX94-WA4B]; Beastie Boys Co-Founder Adam Yauch Dead at 47, 
ROLLING STONE (May 4, 2012), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/beastie-boys-co-founder-
adam-yauch-dead-at-48-20120504 [https://perma.cc/7LH4-CRGV]. 
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purposes.”5 Underscoring their apparent importance to him, Yauch had 
actually penned the italicized words onto the face of his will.6 
At the time the will was offered for probate, commentators identified 
several complexities raised by this provision, such as its application to 
works that were jointly owned and the scope of the words “advertising 
purposes.”7 Indeed, the court in the Monster Energy trial excluded the 
will from evidence essentially on these grounds and also out of concern 
that the admission of such a spectral statement might sway the emotions 
of the jury.8 But even unmoored from the context of that litigation, the 
Yauch will constitutes a bold dead-hand maneuver—an attempt to direct 
the exploitation of copyright interests from beyond the grave. It is not 
clear, however, that society should countenance such an attempt. 
In order to appreciate why one might be skeptical of such an attempt, 
it is first necessary to take a step back. The very nature of culture as an 
amalgam of art, music, literature, and numerous other inputs that should 
be permitted to develop freely has great appeal. It is for this reason that 
many commentators criticize the current regime of intellectual property 
rights.9 They see these rights as artificially hamstringing the ability of 
cultural participants to engage fully with the world—to the detriment of 
society and future generations.10 Some have even labeled intellectual 
                                                     
5. Will of Adam Yauch, at 8, ¶ 6 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. June 6, 2001) (emphasis added).  
6. Id. For a photographic copy of this portion of Yauch’s will, see infra at section I.D. Yauch’s 
words were also invoked in another contemporaneous litigation. See Jon Blistein, Beastie Boys 
Settle Lawsuit over ‘Girls’ Toy Commercial, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/beastie-boys-settle-lawsuit-over-girls-toy-commercial-
20140318 [https://perma.cc/942G-S8X7] (discussing lawsuit over GoldieBlox’s use of Beastie Boys 
song in ad). 
7. E.g., Wendy S. Goffe, Part of Beastie Boy Adam Yauch’s Will, Banning Use of Music in Ads, 
May Not Be Valid, FORBES (Aug. 13, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2012/ 
08/13/part-of-beastie-boy-adam-yauchs-will-banning-use-of-music-in-ads-may-not-be-valid/ 
[perma.cc/SUF3-DAKD]. 
8. Transcript of Trial at 411–13, Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424, 427–
28 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (No. 12 Civ. 6065) (excluding the will under Federal Rule of Evidence 403).  
9. See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom to Copy: Copyright, Creation, and Context, 
41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477, 521–22 (2007) (arguing that “the role of copying in the creative 
process” is not sufficiently appreciated in legal, “author-centric conceptions” of creation). 
10. Cf. id. at 480 (“[C]opyright doctrine does not adequately accommodate the varied ways in 
which many artists actually create works.”). Importantly, such rights affect not only uses that 
directly compete with the initial creator, but also adaptive and scholarly uses that seek merely to 
build upon earlier works or to chronicle social developments. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106(2) (2012) (setting forth the derivative work right under copyright law). 
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property rights holders as “stewards” of culture, in addition to being 
“owners,”11 because of their vast power as cultural gatekeepers. 
As the initial stewards of their own work, authors do not always make 
farsighted decisions.12 Irving Berlin was wildly successful in harnessing 
the financial power of the copyright system.13 But Berlin was 
shortsighted in refusing to permit his music to be quoted in a seminal 
treatment of the relevant musical form.14 Specifically, Alec Wilder, in 
his comprehensive analysis of American popular song, was able to 
obtain most of the permissions he needed.15 But his book will forever 
contain a glaring gap for readers and scholars with respect to Berlin’s 
works.16 
Scholars and other commentators have likewise documented 
decisions by authors’ successors that appear out of step with the public 
interest.17 For example, James Joyce’s successor-in-interest, his 
grandson, has become persona non grata in many circles for his stringent 
management of Joyce’s copyrights.18 President Warren G. Harding’s 
successors also clamped down on the scholarly use—forty years after his 
                                                     
11. See, e.g., Shubha Ghosh, Managing the Intellectual Property Sprawl, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
979, 1007 (2012) (arguing that intellectual property owners “are just stewards for a broader class of 
users, . . . [including] consumers, future generations, and constituents that rely on property but may 
not have not [sic] a direct ownership stake”); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward 
“For Limited Times,” 88 B.U. L. REV. 685, 704 (2008) (reviewing LIOR ZEMER, THE IDEA OF 
AUTHORSHIP IN COPYRIGHT (2007)) (underscoring that “copyright ownership involves duties to the 
public as well as rights in the work”). 
12. For an arguable example, see Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(pursuing copyright claims against biographer’s use of unpublished letters). 
13. See generally Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation: Hearings 
on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts & Intellectual Prop. of the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 272 (1995) (prepared statement of Mary Ellin Barrett, 
daughter of Irving Berlin) (arguing in favor of copyright term extension). 
14. See ALEC WILDER, AMERICAN POPULAR SONG: THE GREAT INNOVATORS, 1900–1950, at 91 
(James T. Maher ed., 1990). 
15. See generally id. However, in at least one unsuccessful instance, an unnamed composer 
actually pleaded with the rights-holding publisher on Wilder’s behalf, to no avail. Id. 
16. Id. at 91; cf. Book Note, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1518, 1518 (1981) (reviewing FAIR USE AND FREE 
INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA (John Shelton Lawrence & Bernard Timberg eds., 
1980)) (placing some of the responsibility on “the scholar’s own publisher, who would insist that he 
obtain (and pay for) permission from the copyright owner”). 
17. E.g., RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
DEAD 144–47 (2010); Deven R. Desai, The Life and Death of Copyright, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 219, 
258–59; Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound’s Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights and the Problem of Heirs, 
56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1822–27 (2009); Eva E. Subotnik, Copyright and the Living Dead?: 
Succession Law and the Postmortem Term, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 123–24 (2015). 
18. E.g., MADOFF, supra note 17, at 144–46; Desai, supra note 17, at 258–59; Spoo, supra note 
17, at 1825–27; Subotnik, supra note 17, at 123. 
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death—of Harding’s love letters to his paramour that might have 
revealed her German allegiances during World War I.19 
Such control by authors and other rights holders is tolerated—albeit 
with resistance20—because the compensating benefits are deemed worth 
it. Those benefits primarily consist of upfront incentives to create 
expressive works in the first place. But a fundamentally different 
calculus is raised by attempts, such as by Yauch, to control the uses of 
works after one’s death. To begin with, in many instances, valuable 
works are jointly owned. This means that other individuals or entities 
may have legal rights in the works.21 Nevertheless, when the court asked 
the Beastie Boys’ counsel whether Yauch’s will could block the living 
co-owners’ rights to license the group’s music in advertising, counsel 
responded, “I believe it can.”22 This response, perhaps tendered in an 
off-handed fashion, cannot be right as a matter of law. There is no 
reason why a deceased co-owner would have more power to control 
exploitation than he did while alive. 
Even where joint ownership is not an issue, however, there are 
significant reasons to be wary of permitting a deceased author to dictate 
how his successors can use the materials that he created—and, a fortiori, 
of permitting successive owners to so dictate. While attempted restraints 
on advertising uses might not tug at the heartstrings with respect to our 
cultural policies, they may cause significant hardships for an author’s 
beneficiaries. Moreover, given the special and undeniable interest 
                                                     
19. Jordan Michael Smith, The Letters That Warren G. Harding’s Family Didn’t Want You to 
See, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (July 7, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2014/07/13/magazine/letters-
warren-g-harding.html [https://perma.cc/J8K8-3NL4] (describing successful lawsuit by Harding 
family in 1964 to prevent biographer Francis Russell from using the letters). “The Harding family 
feared that publishing them would further tarnish Harding’s legacy and hurt the entire family. To 
the dismay of many historians, a settlement was reached in which the Harding family, who owned 
the copyright to the letters, agreed to donate them to the Library of Congress in return for a 
guarantee that they remain sealed for 50 years.” Id.; see also JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH 
A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN CULTURAL TREASURES 135–38 (1999); Jennifer 
Schuessler, Warren G. Harding’s Racy Love Letters Unsealed, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2014), 
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/warren-g-hardings-racy-love-letters-unsealed/?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/ 27PM-R7T7]. 
20. See, e.g., Spoo, supra note 17, at 1828 (noting the “simple intuition” that “[h]eirs (and even 
authors) might not be the best stewards of literary legacies”). 
21. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:7 (2015) (footnotes omitted) (“As 
a co-owner in the whole, each joint author may utilize the work him- or herself without the other’s 
permission and indeed over the other author’s objection.”). 
22. Transcript of Trial at 403, Beastie Boys v. Monster Energy Co., 66 F. Supp. 3d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 
2014) (No. 12 Civ. 6065).  
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society may have in these assets,23 other restrictions, like bans on 
quotations or adaptations, or the ordered destruction of works, might 
cause significant social harm. If enforced, these control mechanisms 
mean that the public has to contend not only with a long postmortem 
copyright term but also with circumstances in which uses of copyrighted 
works are foreclosed—even if no living right holder objects. 
Furthermore, as authors become increasingly savvy about their 
intellectual property holdings, there is reason to suppose that this sort of 
attempted control will become more routine. 
Viewed through the lens of general succession law trends, the 
evidence might suggest that strong control is warranted.24 The 
weakening of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the emergence of incentive 
trusts, and the continued availability of conditional bequests and 
honorary trusts all portray a dead hand whose clasp is growing ever 
tighter.25 At the same time, other trends in trust modification and 
termination law bespeak increasing protectiveness of the interests of 
living successors.26 And courts have long refused to enforce 
testamentary provisions that are capricious or socially harmful.27 
This Article makes two principal points. First, it argues that cloaking 
authorial instructions in the garb of a fiduciary duty should by no means 
guarantee their enforceability. Second, it argues that the enforceability of 
such instructions should be guided by federal copyright policy. That 
policy, while favoring postmortem copyrights, nevertheless should be 
interpreted to disfavor attempts to strip living successors—including fair 
users—of the power to make autonomous decisions about copyrighted 
works.28 To the contrary, as will be demonstrated, federal copyright 
policy militates in favor of ensuring, to the greatest extent possible, that 
at least one living person be in a position to make decisions about works 
still under copyright—even if that means overriding the author’s 
wishes.29 
                                                     
23. E.g., SAX, supra note 19, at 46–47, 100–01; Desai, supra note 17, at 262–68; Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, The Right To Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 813, 832 (2005). 
24. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 
640 (2004) (“[U]nder the American approach . . . the donor’s intent controls.”). Throughout this 
Article, I refer to donors as testators or settlors, depending on the context. The fundamental regard 
for the donative intent of each is an established principle of American succession law. 
25. See infra section II.C. 
26. See infra section II.C. 
27. See, e.g., infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
28. See infra note 355 and accompanying text. 
29. See infra section III.C. 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I outlines the various means by 
which authors communicate their wishes for the works they have 
created. Part II situates postmortem artistic control within the types of 
control decedents seek to exert more generally. It considers the policy 
justifications for—and for interfering with—dead-hand control in other 
contexts. Part III applies the lessons from that general exploration to the 
artistic realm and balances the interests involved, arguing why certain 
kinds of artistic instructions should or should not be enforced.30 It 
concludes that, to comport with federal copyright policy, aggressive 
authorial instructions must yield to the needs of the living to the 
maximum extent possible. This is particularly true where authors seek to 
bar entire categories of uses of their works and where, on balance, 
enforcement is likely not needed to protect against the premature 
destruction of the work by the author. As one distinguished commentator 
aptly stated, “In the end, death is the determining factor: death means the 
final abdication of power. No matter what we wish, in dying we 
relinquish control over ourselves and our work.”31 
I. MEANS OF EXERTING ARTISTIC CONTROL AFTER DEATH 
Considering the circumstances, dead authors are a prolific group. 
While the creation of new works of authorship is clearly foreclosed after 
death, previously authored works often come to light, or are re-packaged 
in different ways, after authors die. On the one hand, many unknown 
artists gain widespread public attention only following their deaths.32 
For example, the enormously influential play Woyzeck, written by the 
German dramatist Georg Büchner in the mid-1830s, stayed in relative 
obscurity for almost eighty years following Büchner’s death at a young 
                                                     
30. Admittedly, I leave for another day an examination of the estate tax implications of the 
analysis and proposal I offer in this Article.  
31. Roxana Robinson, Burn Your Letters?, NEW YORKER: PAGE-TURNER (May 22, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/burn-your-letters [https://perma.cc/2QY8-S7NQ] 
(“Maybe the real question is not, ‘Should we restrict our letters after we die?’ but ‘Should we sit 
down at this desk and start making sentences?’ That’s the biggest risk.”). Robinson is the current 
president of the Authors Guild. See Board of Directors, AUTHORS GUILD, https://www. 
authorsguild.org/who-we-are/board-directors/ [https://perma.cc/82G9-HMNL].  
32. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, The Heir’s Not Apparent: A Legal Battle Over Vivian Maier’s 
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/arts/design/a-legal-battle-
over-vivian-maiers-work.html [https://perma.cc/FY8Q-JTX4] (describing posthumous rise to 
prominence of street photographer Vivian Maier); John Williams, Lucia Berlin’s Roving, Rowdy 
Life Is Reflected in a Book of Her Stories, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2015), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/08/17/books/lucia-berlins-roving-rowdy-life-is-reflected-in-a-book-of-her-stories 
.html [https://perma.cc/9E67-A9WN] (describing posthumous rise to prominence of writer Lucia 
Berlin). 
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age until its first staging in 1913.33 On the other hand, recent years have 
seen the posthumous publication of works by American luminaries like 
Laura Ingalls Wilder,34 Ernest Hemingway,35 and Theodor Seuss 
Geisel,36 whose talents were appreciated during their own lifetimes.37 
The choices about how and when to edit and publish these works are 
left in the hands of the living—either transferees of these rights during 
the author’s lifetime or her at-death successors.38 This is because, to 
state the obvious, authors largely are not in a position to control their 
works or their reputations after they die. Nevertheless, certain authors 
attempt to influence, if not outright control, the treatment of their works 
after their deaths.39 This Part surveys the ways authors seek to exert such 
control, which are not mutually exclusive. 
                                                     
33. Robert Scanlan, Coiled Razor Wire and Shards of Glass, AMERICAN REPARATORY THEATER, 
http://americanrepertorytheater.org/inside/articles/coiled-razor-wire-and-shards-glass 
[https://perma.cc/GNZ8-BGS9]. 
34. Ruth Graham, Those Happy Golden Years, SLATE (Nov. 7 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2014/11/little_house_nonfiction_laura_ingalls_wilder_s_m
emoir_pioneer_girl_reviewed.html [https://perma.cc/3NNS-NB27] (reviewing Pioneer Girl, 
Wilder’s “first-person, nonfictional account of 16 years of her childhood,” which was first published 
about eighty-five years after Wilder wrote it). 
35. Hemingway’s A Moveable Feast was first published posthumously in 1964. A much more 
recent version, published in 2009, which caused great controversy over its revised portrayal of 
Hemingway’s second wife, was edited by her grandson. See A. E. Hotchner, Don’t Touch ‘A 
Moveable Feast,’ N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/opinion/ 
20hotchner.html [https://perma.cc/ J4VX-GJF3]; Motoko Rich, ‘Moveable Feast’ Is Recast by 
Hemingway Grandson, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/28/books/ 
28hemingway.html [https://perma.cc/8WHZ-GPVE]. 
36. See discussion infra section I.B. 
37. See R. Anthony Reese, Public but Private: Copyright’s New Unpublished Public Domain, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 585, 597 (2007) (collecting other notable examples). 
38. There is no doubt that some of those choices would make their associated authors blanch. See, 
e.g., Claudia La Rocco, Review: ‘On Writing,’ a Charles Bukowski Collection of Rants and Musings 
in Letters, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/10/books/review-on-
writing-a-charles-bukowski-collection-of-rants-and-musings-in-letters.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/ 
W3RB-GYWL] (discussing the steady publication of books by Charles Bukowski following his 
death in 1994). As La Rocco puts it, “It’s hard to imagine Bukowski putting much stock in the 
choices made in his absence: ‘Writers have to put up with this editor thing; it is ageless and eternal 
and wrong,’ he wrote.” Id. 
39. Of course, not all creators seek to remain involved. Author Neil Gaiman said:  
I love copyright—I love the fact that I can feed myself and feed my children with the stuff I 
make up. On the other hand, copyright length right now is life plus 75 [sic] years, and I don’t 
know that I want to be in control of what I’ve created for 75 years after I’ve died! I don’t know 
that I want to be feeding my great-grandchildren. I feel like they should be able to look after 
themselves, and not necessarily put limits on what I’ve created, if there’s something that would 
do better in the cultural dialogue. 
Neil Gaiman & Kazuo Ishiguro, “Let’s Talk About Genre”: Neil Gaiman and Kazuo Ishiguro in 
Conversation, NEW STATESMAN (June 4 2015), http://www.newstatesman.com/2015/05/neil-
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Novelist Roxana Robinson offers three explanations for authors’ 
attempted restrictions on material: 
[O]ne, that it’s private, and its release would violate the privacy 
of someone still living. Another, that it would reveal behavior or 
information that would embarrass the writer or her friends, and 
invite disapprobation. A third, particularly important for a 
writer, is that the work is unsuccessful or unfinished, unprepared 
for scholarly scrutiny.40 
While it is often difficult, if not impossible, to know precisely why 
any given author tries to control his or her works after death, the 
examples that follow appear to reflect these and other reasons. 
A. Outright Testamentary Gifts 
An author’s ability to control aspects of her post-death legacy derives 
from her rights to control her tangible and intangible works. Tangible 
materials, like unpublished manuscripts, canvases, or diaries, pass to her 
successors as personal property. With respect to intangible copyright 
interests, which now generally last for the life of the author plus seventy 
years,41 authors and subsequent owners may likewise transfer ownership 
by will, trust, or intestate succession.42 
In many cases, an author’s specifications as to the future uses of her 
tangible or intangible assets are manifested solely through the kinds of 
dispositions she makes in her will. A specific gift of these interests may 
suggest that the author was thinking particularly about who would 
control them after her death. A residuary gift, by contrast, need not even 
identify the interests.43 This is because a residuary clause functions as a 
catch-all bequest of every property interest not otherwise disposed of.44 
                                                     
gaiman-kazuo-ishiguro-interview-literature-genre-machines-can-toil-they-can-t-imagine 
[https://perma.cc/T2QF-6B4P]. Many thanks to Betsy Rosenblatt for this reference. 
40. Robinson, supra note 31. 
41. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
42. Id. § 201(d)(1) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any 
means of conveyance or by operation of law, and may be bequeathed by will or pass as personal 
property by the applicable laws of intestate succession.”). 
43. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 374 (9th ed. 
2013) (distinguishing among specific, general, and residuary gifts). 
44. See id.; David S. Olson, First Amendment Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. 
L. REV. 1393, 1412 (2009) (“Although the ownership of copyrights in valuable works by famous 
authors is usually established at the time of death when other assets are divided, ownership of the 
copyrights of more ordinary people is less likely to be determined upon death. Thus, such rights 
likely pass with the residue of the estate.”). 
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Residuary gifts can cause great mischief for this very reason: most 
people may have a general sense of the balance of their property not 
specifically devised in the earlier parts of a will. But they may have a 
less concrete sense of the incorporeal assets, like intellectual property 
rights, that will also be caught by and passed through a residuary 
clause.45 Thus, where an artist bequeaths a painting she painted (and to 
which she retained copyright) to Beneficiary X, while making 
Beneficiary Y her residuary beneficiary, Beneficiary X will own the 
tangible work while Beneficiary Y will own the copyright in that work.46 
Both specific and residuary gifts of these interests can be seen as 
expressive acts by the author-testator,47 and indeed, they can instantiate 
great power in their recipient. But such gifts are different in kind from 
gifts that are intertwined with restrictions on how rights or works can be 
exploited in the future.48 
B. Leading by Example 
Some authors die having expressed preferences through the examples 
they set during their own lives.49 Playwright and novelist Thornton 
Wilder was not the kind who left instructions.50 In their absence, his first 
generation of successors—“those closest to the flame,” as his nephew 
and literary executor Tappan Wilder put it—“typically and 
understandably adopted the default position of continuing to honor, with 
rare exceptions, the policies of the departed. Two examples of Thornton 
Wilder’s policies that were largely followed: not publishing or 
                                                     
45. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Neil J. Rosini, Entm’t Lawyer, Franklin, Weinrib, Rudell 
& Vassallo, P.C. (June 29, 2015) (on file with author) (Mr. Rosini is an entertainment lawyer 
focusing on intellectual property matters). 
46. See 17 U.S.C. § 202; Lee-ford Tritt, Liberating Estates Law from the Constraints of 
Copyright, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 109, 143–44 (2006). 
47. See David Horton, Testation and Speech, 101 GEO. L.J. 61, 85 (2012). 
48. Id. at 64 n.17; accord Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory 
of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 1329 
(1999) (favoring the ability of “property owners to designate their successors” but disfavoring their 
“superintend[ence] [over] their successors’ behavior”); Subotnik, supra note 17, at 118–24 
(highlighting this distinction and arguing that it is often imprecise to label outright testamentary 
gifts of copyright interests as a species of dead-hand control). 
49. Cf. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 244 N.E.2d 250, 253, 256 (N.Y. 1968) 
(putting great stock in Ernest Hemingway’s “words and conduct” during life in adjudicating state 
common-law copyright claims). 
50. Email from Tappan Wilder, Literary Ex’r and Managing Member, Wilder Family LLC, to 
Eva E. Subotnik, Associate Professor of Law, St. John’s Univ. Sch. of Law (Feb. 17, 2017, 21:10 
EST) (on file with author). 
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performing excerpts of his works or allowing musical adaptations of key 
dramas or stage adaptations of key novels.”51 
Another example is Theodor Seuss Geisel, the author of the Dr. Seuss 
books, who left behind nearly complete drafts for a children’s book that 
he never published during his lifetime.52 After the drafts were discovered 
in 2013, a Random House employee who had worked directly with 
Geisel was charged with bringing the book to publication.53 While 
Geisel had not left explicit instructions—indeed, it is unknown why he 
chose not to publish the book during his lifetime54—the employee relied 
on artistic choices made by Geisel while still alive.55 These included 
referencing instructions for coloring in works that Geisel gave when he 
was too ill to work; piecing the text together by taping pages up on a 
wall (as he was wont to do); consulting the works he had published 
around the same time; and “follow[ing] his method of picking hues from 
a chart . . . and marking up each page like a paint-by-numbers project.”56 
C. Discussions with the Living 
Still other authors attempt to exert some artistic control by having 
discussions with their future successors or in ways that are operative 
during their own lifetimes. For example, Edward Mendelson, literary 
executor for the W. H. Auden estate, knew the poet in life. Before he 
died, Auden said to him, “You must use your judgment” in making 
decisions about licensing and publication.57 Renowned children’s book 
author Maurice Sendak opted for a similar approach with his executor 
                                                     
51. Id. The second-generation successors, by contrast, selectively permit these and other activities 
to shed more light on the writer’s life and work. These later successors “care about the flame but are 
not slaves to it.” Id.; see also Tappan Wilder, Thornton Wilder for the Twenty-First Century, in 
THORNTON WILDER: NEW PERSPECTIVES 3, 4–6 (Jackson R. Bryer & Lincoln Konkle eds., 2013); 
Telephone Interviews with Tappan Wilder, Literary Ex’r and Managing Member, Wilder Family 
LLC (July 3, 2014 and July 15, 2014) (on file with author). I am very grateful to Tappan Wilder for 
so generously and helpfully speaking with me on this topic. 
52. Alexandra Alter, Dr. Seuss Book: Yes, They Found It in a Box, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/22/books/dr-seuss-book-a-discovery-in-a-box-and-then-a-
reconstruction.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/XJB2-57RU].  
53. Id. 
54. Id.; see also Maria Russo, Dr. Seuss’ ‘What Pet Should I Get?’, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/26/books/review/dr-seuss-what-pet-should-i-get-review.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5VV-Z4F2] (reviewing DR. SEUSS, WHAT PET SHOULD I GET? (2015)). 
55. Alter, supra note 52. 
56. Id.  
57. See Interview with Edward Mendelson, Literary Ex’r for W. H. Auden, in New York, N.Y. 
(May 15, 2014) (on file with author). I am very grateful to Edward Mendelson for the information 
he provided to me in this regard. 
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Lynn Caponera, his former housekeeper and caretaker. Sendak informed 
Caponera that it would be her responsibility to pare down the belongings 
in his house in order to transform it into a museum:58  
“He said, ‘Lynn, you’ll know what to keep and what not to,”’ 
said Ms. Caponera . . . . “And I thought, ‘Oh my God, I don’t 
know, it’s too much.’ But he was right. I am very, very aware of 
the things that meant the most to him.”59 
Taking a different tack, Kurt Vonnegut wrote letters that actually 
attempted to ensure the free use of his works by the letters’ recipients. 
Specifically, approximately ten years before his death, Vonnegut sent 
one scholar of his work a letter granting him “unrestricted permission to 
quote anything I ever said or wrote, at any length, and without notice or 
compensation.”60 The failure to obtain such a letter caused significant 
problems for a biographer after Vonnegut’s death.61 
Institutional loyalties can sometimes be a driving force for authors. 
Justice Hugo Black, not long before his death in 1971, instructed his 
trusted secretary via memorandum that 
I do not believe that my personal notes on and for Court 
conferences should be left in the official files or made 
public. . . . If you have any questions about what are conference 
notes to be burned and what are not, . . . Hugo, Jr. will tell you 
what to do, which is to destroy them all.62 
Justice Black expressed concern that publication of his papers would 
both present a skewed historical record and impede free discussion 
among the Justices.63 While Justice Black, as he neared death, wanted 
immediate action taken (and some was taken while he was still alive), 
                                                     
58. Sendak provided that his house in rural Connecticut was to be used as a study center and 
museum. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 4–5, ¶ 5.B.1(b) (Feb. 6, 2011); id. at 5, ¶ 5.B.3(b); see also 
Randy Kennedy, Sendak’s Estate: Debating Where the Things Go, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/books/maurice-sendaks-estate-debating-where-the-things-
go.html [https://perma.cc/2HZ4-BRGL]. I thank Philip Nel for making Sendak’s will publicly 
available. See Philip Nel, Maurice Sendak’s Will, NINE KINDS OF PIE: PHILIP NEL’S BLOG (June 10, 
2015), http://www.philnel.com/2015/06/10/sendakwill/ [https://perma.cc/BZQ4-KYNS]. 
59. Kennedy, supra note 58. 
60. Craig Fehrman, The Last Word, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 12, 2011), https://newrepublic 
.com/article/96122/vonnegut-shields-and-so-it-goes-estate [https://perma.cc/CX4D-82C4] (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
61. Id. 
62. See SAX, supra note 19, at 100 (quoting TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND 
HIS CRITICS 303 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Justice Black had instructed his son 
Hugo, Jr. similarly. Id.; see also HUGO BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 250–55 (1975). 
63. See SAX, supra note 19, at 100–02. 
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his successors continued the destructive activity after his death in 
accordance with his instructions.64 
In other instances, the destructive orders seem to reflect the author’s 
view that the works are unfinished or imperfect or would in some way 
compromise his hoped-for artistic legacy. Vladimir Nabokov, who died 
in 1977, “left instructions . . . to burn the 138 handwritten index cards 
that made up the rough draft of his final and unfinished novel, The 
Original of Laura.”65 Nabokov had been “feverishly” working on the 
draft while terminally ill in a hospital in Lausanne.66 As things looked 
increasingly grim, he “had a very serious conversation with his wife, in 
which he impressed upon her that if Laura remained unfinished at his 
death, it was to be burned.”67 Nabokov’s wife did not adhere to these 
instructions and, three decades later, his son decided that Nabokov, if 
alive, would not oppose the work’s publication since it “had survived the 
hum of time this long.”68 (Of course, this was the case only because 
Nabokov’s successors had failed to carry out his instructions.) 
Nabokov’s son underscored that his father “did not desire to burn The 
Original of Laura willy-nilly, but to live on . . . to finish at least a 
complete draft.”69 
The poster child for such instructions is Franz Kafka. Kafka issued 
both written and oral instructions to his close friend Max Brod to destroy 
all of his unpublished writings,70 which included the manuscripts of The 
Trial, The Castle and Amerika—instructions that Brod did not follow.71 
Specifically, at his death, Kafka left behind two letters, one of which 
instructed Brod as follows: “Everything I leave behind me . . . in the way 
of diaries, manuscripts, letters (my own and others’), sketches, and so 
                                                     
64. Id. at 100–01. For a critique, see Kathryn A. Watts, Judges and Their Papers, 88 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1665, 1672 (2013) (“[J]udicial papers should be treated as governmental rather than private 
property, just as presidential papers are.”). 
65. The Original of Laura by Vladimir Nabokov, KNOPF DOUBLEDAY PUBLISHING GROUP, 
http://knopfdoubleday.com/nabokov/ [https://perma.cc/AS3Y-LSHW]. 
66. Dmitri Nabokov, Introduction to VLADIMIR NABOKOV, THE ORIGINAL OF LAURA (DYING IS 
FUN) xi, xvi (Dmitri Nabokov ed., 2013). 
67. Id. at xvi–xvii. 
68. Id. at xviii; see also Aleksandar Hemon, Hands Off Nabokov, SLATE (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/arts/books/2009/11/hands_off_nabokov.1.html [https://perma.cc/JG 
4R-4BV8] (disapproving of the decision to publish the work). 
69. Nabokov, supra note 66, at xvii. 
70. See SAX, supra note 19, at 46. 
71. See Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 830–31; Nili Cohen, The Betrayed(?) Wills of Kafka and 
Brod, 27 L. & LITERATURE 1, 12–13 (2015). 
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on, to be burned unread.”72 But Kafka and Brod had also had 
conversations in which Brod informed Kafka that he could never bring 
himself to adhere to Kafka’s verbally expressed requests in that regard.73 
This has led to much speculation about what Kafka really wanted 
because, knowing Brod’s response ahead of time, Kafka nevertheless 
declined to leave the task to some other party.74 
Although Kafka had studied law, he did not, apparently, seek to 
execute a legally binding will.75 Rather, as Nili Cohen points out, in 
forgoing testamentary formalities, “it would appear that Kafka imposed 
upon his friend a moral, not a legal, obligation.”76 In that way, he 
differed from the next group of authors. 
D. Specific Instructions in a Will or Trust 
Exhibiting the most naked attempts to exert post-death control, 
authors have included particular instructions in their testamentary 
instruments—with varying levels of success. Authors sometimes try to 
require their successors to consult with one another. Pulitzer Prize 
winning poet James Merrill, who died in 1995, started by giving his 
literary executors “full power and authority to edit . . . my literary 
papers . . . and to make proper arrangements for publication . . . as they 
may consider wise or expedient.”77 Immediately after this broad grant, 
however, Merrill provided that the literary executors “shall consult with 
the head of the Department of Special Collections of the Olin Library 
System of Washington University” presumably about these very same 
matters.78 
                                                     
72. LAW, LANGUAGE, AND ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 1–5 
(William R. Bishin & Christopher D. Stone eds., 1972) (quoting Max Brod, Postscript to the First 
Edition (1925) of FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 326–35 (Modern Library ed. 1956)) [hereinafter 
Bishin & Stone]; cf. Judith Butler, Who Owns Kafka?, 33 LONDON REV. BOOKS 3, 8 (Mar. 3, 2011), 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v33/n05/judith-butler/who-owns-kafka [https://perma.cc/AQ3V-YY5B] (“And 
yet the letter [to Brod] makes a demand to destroy the writing, which would logically entail the 
nullification of the letter itself, and so nullify even the command that it delivers.”). 
73. See SAX, supra note 19, at 46; Cohen, supra note 71, at 7. 
74. SAX, supra note 19, at 46–47; Cohen, supra note 71, at 7; see also Mary Sarah Bilder, The 
Shrinking Back: The Law of Biography, 43 STAN. L. REV. 299, 330 (1991). 
75. Cohen, supra note 71, at 4. But see Bishin & Stone, supra note 72, at 6 (suggesting that 
Kafka’s instructions could have constituted a valid holographic will under the prevailing law). 
76. Cohen, supra note 71, at 4. 
77. Will of James I. Merrill, at 13, ¶ 19.A (Sept. 30, 1994). I am very grateful to J. D. McClatchy 
and Stephen Yenser, co-literary executors for the James Merrill estate, for providing me with the 
relevant provisions of Merrill’s will and with helpful background information about the Merrill 
estate. 
78. Id. 
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Even that kind of innocuous-sounding instruction can lead to 
litigation. Maurice Sendak, for example, named a “literary advisor” who 
was to be consulted by his executors before making decisions about 
certain literary matters, though he gave the executors ultimate say.79 
Sendak also stated that it was his “wish that the MAURICE SENDAK 
FOUNDATION INC. make arrangements with THE ROSENBACH 
MUSEUM AND LIBRARY for the display of” his artwork “upon such 
terms and conditions and at such times as shall be determined by the 
[Foundation] in consultation with [The Rosenbach].”80 This provision 
formed part of the basis of a lawsuit by the Rosenbach, which claimed 
that the Foundation had failed to seek out or heed its input.81 
Beyond these arguably milder forms of attempted control, authors 
have also sought to gain a more substantial reach. Perhaps reflecting a 
desire for privacy, some instructions concern access to or destruction of 
the author’s works. Merrill, for example, instructed the Department of 
Special Collections “in its discretion [to] permit access . . . to my 
notebooks and journals prepared subsequent to 1980 only after fifteen 
(15) years from the date of my death.”82 Sendak, in his will, “direct[ed] 
my executors to destroy, immediately following my death, all of my 
personal letters, journals and diaries.”83 
Lest one think—based on the foregoing discussion—that issuing such 
instructions is the province solely of male authors, Willa Cather provides 
a ready counterpart.84 During life, she “took obsessive care over [her 
                                                     
79. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 11–12, ¶ 13.B (Feb. 6, 2011). These matters included the “sale or 
licensing of any copyrights,” the “[a]rrangements and contracts for publication of [his] work,” the 
“granting or withholding of permissions for the use of any of [his] work,” and the “preservation or 
destruction of drafts of [his] drawings, illustrations and writings.” Id.  
80. Id. at 5, ¶ 5.B.3(b). 
81. See Peter Dobrin, Rosenbach Sues Sendak Foundation over Rare Books, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(Nov. 10, 2014), http://articles.philly.com/2014-11-11/news/56395085_1_sendak-items-rosenbach-
museum-the-rosenbach [https://perma.cc/STF7-GEQ5]. The complaint also alleged that the estate 
had not turned over the multimillion-dollar rare book collection that Sendak gave outright to the 
Rosenbach in his will. Id. However, the litigation has apparently settled. See Peter Dobrin, 
Settlement Reached in Rosenbach’s Maurice Sendak Lawsuit, PHILA. INQUIRER (Nov. 29, 2016), 
http://www.philly.com/philly/columnists/peter_dobrin/Settlement-in-Sendak-lawsuit-.html 
[https://perma.cc/STF7-GEQ5]. 
82. Will of James I. Merrill, at 13, ¶ 19.C (Sept. 30, 1994). 
83. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 1, ¶ 2 (Feb. 6, 2011). 
84. Another possible counterpart is Harper Lee. According to one journalist, Lee’s will banned 
any additional film remakes of To Kill a Mockingbird. See Billy Heller, My Encounter with the 
Reclusive Harper Lee, N.Y. POST (July 13, 2015), http://nypost.com/2015/07/13/my-encounter-
with-the-reclusive-harper-lee/ [https://perma.cc/524N-5JBU]. It is not possible, however, to 
substantiate the claim. See Jennifer Crossley Howard, Judge Seals Harper Lee’s Will From Public’s 
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books’] presentation: quibbling with publishers over margin widths, 
forbidding excerpts for anthologies and banning movie adaptations.”85 
This desire for control carried over into her will, in which she forbade 
the publication of her letters and the adaptation of her works into other 
media.86 One scholar has “called Cather’s late-life obsession with 
privacy an ‘enduring mystery,’”87 but for a time it was speculated by 
some that it reflected a desire to prevent the dissemination of 
information about her sexuality.88 The ban on adaptations may have 
been based on her unhappiness with particular adaptations.89 
While Cather, “realizing the complexity and difficulty of dealing in 
rights with respect to literary property,” gave great discretion to her 
trustee in making the relevant decisions, that discretion applied only to 
the exploitation of intellectual property rights that she had not 
forbidden.90 The most she would yield with respect to the proscribed 
uses was in explicitly declining to charge her fiduciaries “with the duty 
of bringing legal proceedings to restrain the unauthorized use[s]” and 
                                                     
Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/05/books/judge-seals-
harper-lees-will-from-publics-scrutiny.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/WZ5Y-VGL3]. 
85. Jennifer Schuessler, O Revelations! Letters, Once Banned, Flesh Out Willa Cather, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/books/willa-cather-letters-to-be-
published-as-an-anthology.html [https://perma.cc/YT4B-9ZZD]; accord Andrew Jewell & Janis 
Stout, Introduction to THE SELECTED LETTERS OF WILLA CATHER vii, viii (Andrew Jewell & Janis 
Stout eds., 2013). 
86. Willa Cather’s will provides: 
I direct that my Executors and Trustee shall not lease, license or otherwise dispose of the 
following rights in literary properties written by me, viz: dramatization, whether for the 
purpose of spoken stage presentation or otherwise, motion picture, radio broadcasting, 
television and rights of mechanical reproduction, whether by means now in existence or which 
may hereafter be discovered or perfected; and I further direct that neither my Executors nor my 
Trustee shall consent to, or permit, the publication in any form whatsoever, of the whole, or 
any part of any letter or letters written by me in my lifetime, nor the use, exploitation or 
disposal of any other right therein.  
Will of Willa Cather, at 4–5, ¶ 7 (Apr. 29, 1943); see also Intellectual Property: The Willa Cather 
Trust, WILLA CATHER FOUND., https://www.willacather.org/about/permissions/intellectual-property 
[https://perma.cc/96MR-QE5K] [hereinafter Willa Cather Trust IP Policy] (discussing the terms of 
Willa Cather’s will and the Willa Cather Trust’s intellectual property policy). I am very grateful to 
Andrew Jewell for his explanation of how Willa Cather’s will has been construed over time. 
87. Schuessler, supra note 85 (quoting Guy Reynolds, an English professor at the University of 
Nebraska and board member of the Cather Foundation). 
88. Id. More recently, other scholars have offered alternate interpretations. Janis Stout has argued 
that the privacy provisions may have “had less to do with any sexual secrecy than with Cather’s 
overwhelming depression” during the relevant period of time. Id. Stout and Jewell also suggest that 
“Cather’s testamentary restriction on the publication of her letters . . . instead was an act consistent 
with her long-held desire to shape her own public identity.” Jewell & Stout, supra note 85, at viii. 
89. Schuessler, supra note 85 (“‘My decision about dramatization,’ [Cather] wrote after a 
disappointing 1934 adaptation of ‘A Lost Lady,’ ‘is absolute and final.’”). 
90. Will of Willa Cather, at 5, ¶ 9 (Apr. 29, 1943). 
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instead “leav[ing] it to the sole and uncontrolled discretion of my 
Executors and Trustee . . . whether to proceed by legal action to prevent 
the exercise of any of such rights.”91 This provided some leeway to 
depart from her instructions. 
Cather’s instructions were given effect for six decades to prevent even 
scholarly quotation of her letters, leading to much paraphrasing—some 
of it divergent from the original text.92 These prohibitions expired in 
2011 upon the death of Cather’s nephew and second executor; at that 
point, her copyrights passed to a new trust, the Willa Cather Trust, 
which has taken a less stringent approach to uses of her works.93 For 
their part, the editors of a new anthology of Cather’s letters admit that 
“in producing this book . . . we are defying Willa Cather’s stated 
preference that her letters remain hidden from the public eye.”94 But 
publication, they argue, “will do nothing to damage her reputation” and 
instead will “provide insights into her methods and artistic choices” and 
reveal her to be “a complicated, funny, brilliant, flinty, sensitive, 
sometimes confounding human being.”95 
As with Cather’s prohibition on adaptations, some instructions reflect 
great concern over the form or context in which a work might appear—
perhaps on the basis of an author’s artistic vision. Tennessee Williams 
“expressly direct[ed]” his fiduciaries, among other things, to uphold his 
command that “no play which I shall have written . . . be changed in any 
manner . . . except for the customary type of stage directions.”96 Other 
instructions reflect an aversion to the uses of one’s works for advertising 
or other commercial purposes. As mentioned earlier, Adam Yauch’s will 
provided that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary, in no event 
may my image or name or any music or any artistic property created by 
me be used for advertising purposes.”97 Such a deep-seated philosophy 
on this issue is not unusual among musicians. Jim Morrison of The 
                                                     
91. Id. at 5, ¶ 7; see also Jewell & Stout, supra note 85, at ix. 
92. Joan Acocella, What’s in Cather’s Letters, NEW YORKER: PAGE-TURNER (Apr. 9, 2013), 
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/whats-in-cathers-letters [https://perma.cc/W92N-
3H4M]; see also Hermione Lee, Willa Cather: A Hidden Voice, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 11, 2013), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2013/ 07/11/willa-cather-hidden-voice/ [https://perma.cc/W92N-
3H4M] (book review). 
93. Schuessler, supra note 85; see also Willa Cather Trust IP Policy, supra note 86. 
94. Jewell & Stout, supra note 85, at ix. 
95. Id. at ix–x. 
96. LUCY A. MARSH, PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE LAW: WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 18 
(1998) (quoting Will of Tennessee Williams, at Article VIII). Many thanks to Thomas Simmons for 
pointing me to this source. 
97. Will of Adam Yauch, at 8, ¶ 6 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.) (June 6, 2001) (emphasis added). 
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Doors expressed outrage over a deal in the works that would have 
resulted in an ad to the effect of “Come On Buick, Light My Fire.”98 It 
was, in part, an attempt to preserve Morrison’s artistic legacy on this 
front that prompted his bandmate John Densmore to put the kibosh on 
plans to use The Doors’ music for a Cadillac commercial—a deal worth 
fifteen million dollars—many years later after Morrison’s death.99 
 
  
                                                     
98. JOHN DENSMORE, THE DOORS: UNHINGED: JIM MORRISON’S LEGACY GOES ON TRIAL xiii–
xv, 68–69 (2013). 
99. Id. at 9–11, 28, 80. For an account of the agreements, and the disputes, among the bandmates, 
see Geoffrey R. Scott, What Do Jim Morrison, Kurt Cobain, Elvis Presley, and Utagawa Toyoharu 
Have in Common? Protecting Artistic Legacy in the United States and Japan: A Comparison of U.S. 
Legal Principles and Iemoto Seido of Japan, 26 CONN. J. INT’L L. 161, 168–80 (2010). 
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Figure 1: 
Relevant Page from Adam Yauch’s Will100 
 
Political concerns seem to drive yet others. The Austrian writer 
Thomas Bernhard had a deeply complicated relationship with his 
homeland, including its “legacy of guilt and liabilities as well as a proud 
                                                     
100. As a courtesy, I have redacted the names and addresses of the three witnesses. 
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tradition of cultural achievement.”101 Bernhard apparently saw in death 
an opportunity to achieve his “posthumous literary emigration.”102 His 
will provided: 
[N]othing I published during my lifetime, or any of my papers 
wherever they may be after my death, or anything I wrote in 
whatever form, shall be produced, printed, or even just recited 
within the borders of the Austrian state, however that state 
defines itself, for the duration of the legal copyright. 
I emphasize expressly that I do not want to have anything to do 
with the Austrian state and that I reject in perpetuity not only all 
interference but any overtures in that regard by this Austrian 
state concerning my person or my work. After my death, not a 
word shall be published from my papers, wherever such may 
still exist, including letters and scraps of paper.103 
Despite this impassioned articulation, Bernhard’s successors allowed 
the production of his plays in Austria ten years after his death.104 They 
were persuaded that denying multiple generations of his countrymen 
access to his performed works would ultimately cause the death of those 
works.105 
E. Structure of Instructions 
If an author’s restrictions merely constitute a condition on the gift 
itself, it is not clear that the sorts of instructions just described would 
accomplish the desired goal. For example, a bequest to one’s spouse of 
“my copyrights so long as they are not exploited in the context of 
advertising” would convey a fee simple determinable.106 In such a case, 
the author-testator—in actuality, his estate—would retain a reversionary 
interest (a possibility of reverter).107 
So if, for example, the spouse violated the condition and used the 
copyrights in advertising, the copyrights would revert to the estate and, 
if the spouse were the sole beneficiary or heir, she would own the rights 
in fee simple and could do with them as she pleased. Even if the author-
testator had successfully devised the residue of his estate to someone 
                                                     
101. GITTA HONEGGER, THOMAS BERNHARD: THE MAKING OF AN AUSTRIAN ix (2001). 
102. Id. at 306 (quoting HANS HÖLLER, THOMAS BERNHARD 7 (2d ed. 1993)). 
103. Id. at 305–06. 
104. Id. at 306. 
105. Id.  
106. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 836. 
107. Id. 
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else—say, Alma Mater University—that party would then own the 
copyrights outright following the spouse’s violation of the condition. No 
doubt, in the latter case, the surviving spouse would think twice about 
violating the condition. Nevertheless, the point is that in structuring the 
gift in this way, some living person(s) or extant organization(s) (or their 
successors)—or a combination thereof—would ultimately be able to 
make autonomous decisions about the works until the copyright term 
expired. 
Furthermore, an instruction that is precatory is, by its very nature, not 
binding on the fiduciary. Thus, a mere request or hope expressed in a 
testamentary instrument that the fiduciary will exploit the author’s 
copyrights in a particular way would not be enforceable.108 Nor would 
an instrument that fails to meet the basic requirements of a properly 
executed will or trust.109 
For these reasons, authors may attempt to exercise control by framing 
their artistic instructions, like Yauch did, as a duty imposed upon a 
fiduciary, whether an executor or a trustee. In his case, the instruction 
appears in the part of the will where Yauch sets out the powers that he 
conferred upon his executor, whom he named as his wife in the first 
instance.110 
In order to accomplish what Yauch apparently sought to do, imposing 
a fiduciary duty makes sense. Fiduciaries—whether personal 
representatives (that is, executors or administrators) or trustees—owe 
duties in the execution of their charges.111 With respect to the duty of 
loyalty, this means administration of the trust “solely in the interests of 
the beneficiaries.”112 With respect to the duty of prudent 
                                                     
108. For an interesting account of the role that the gender of the testator plays in crucial drafting 
choices, see Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the Law of Precatory 
Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 (2007). 
109. Deborah Gordon has described a particular means of leaving instructions or expressing 
preferences—what she terms “letters non-testamentary,” Deborah S. Gordon, Letters Non-
Testamentary, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 585, 588–89 (2014), which include the more familiar “letter of 
wishes.” Id. at 615–16. These are non-binding letters written by a decedent to accompany a formal 
testamentary instrument for a variety of reasons. Id. at 629–30. 
110. Will of Adam Yauch, at 1, ¶ 5 (N.Y. Surr. Ct.) (June 6, 2001). As is the case for many 
wealthy, privacy-seeking testators, Yauch’s will poured all of his assets into an inter vivos trust that 
he had created. Id. at 1, ¶ 2; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 466 (describing use 
of pour-over wills and trusts and the relative privacy they afford). The trust instrument is not 
publicly available, so it is impossible to know whether Yauch instructed his trustees similarly. 
111. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-703(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (subjecting personal 
representatives to the same “standards of care applicable to trustees”). 
112. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 802(a) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000); accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TRUSTS § 78 (AM. LAW INST. 2007). 
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administration—the care norm—a trustee is to “exercise reasonable care, 
skill, and caution” in “administer[ing] the trust as a prudent person 
would, by considering the purposes” and “terms” of the trust.113 Above 
all, a fiduciary must administer the estate or trust “in accordance with its 
terms and purposes.”114 Accordingly, exploitation of the decedent’s 
copyrights in violation of the prescribed terms would seem to constitute 
a breach of fiduciary duty.115 
Kate O’Neill offers another relevant example with respect to the 
intellectual property left behind by J.D. Salinger. Salinger, who died in 
2010, had created a literary trust in 2008 to hold his copyrights and, 
likely, his manuscripts and other writings.116 O’Neill suggests that 
actions taken after his death by the trustees, his wife Colleen and son 
Matthew,117 so far signal that they intend to continue Salinger’s stringent 
position on exploitation of his copyrights and publicity rights.118 O’Neill 
writes: 
[W]e can only speculate about the extent of the trustees’ 
discretion and how they may ultimately manage Salinger’s 
literary assets. [There are] . . . rumors that the trust directed the 
trustees to “wait a number of years” before publishing anything 
new. As to previously published work, some journalists 
speculated—shortly after Salinger’s death—that the trustees 
might be tempted by a proposal to license a movie based on 
[The] Catcher [in the Rye] because of the possibility that the 
federal tax on Salinger’s estate, which was zero in 2010, might 
be increased retroactively. That no longer seems likely, and 
there is no indication that a movie deal is in the works. At best, 
we can see that Salinger shielded his work and his person from 
public scrutiny in death as he had in life, and so far, the trustees 
                                                     
113. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 804; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1)–(2). 
114. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 801; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (“The trustee has 
a duty to administer the trust, diligently and in good faith, in accordance with the terms of the trust 
and applicable law.”). 
115. It is true, however, that to the extent the authorial instructions are deemed to create what is 
known as an honorary trust, the “honorary trustee [would be] at liberty to perform or to terminate 
the interest and distribute the corpus to residuary legatees or heirs whenever she pleases.” Adam J. 
Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 91 (1999); see also 
discussion infra at section II.C.1. 
116. Kate O’Neill, Copyright Law and the Management of J.D. Salinger’s Literary Estate, 31 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 19, 28 (2012). 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 28–29. Salinger, as is well known, was fiercely protective of his work. See, e.g., 
Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 70–71 (2d Cir. 2010); Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 
90, 92–94 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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seem to be following his example. This could be because the 
trust so directs them, because they choose to do so in deference 
to his memory, or due to personal reasons.119 
In the remainder of this Article, I contextualize and evaluate the sorts 
of control mechanisms described up to this point. 
II. CURRENT VITAL SIGNS OF DEAD-HAND CONTROL 
A number of questions emerge in the wake of this survey of methods 
by which authors attempt to control the fates of their works after their 
deaths. Most particularly, if a fiduciary disregards an artistic 
instruction—to disallow quotations, to wait a number of years before 
publishing new editions, to exploit copyrights solely in a non-advertising 
context, to refuse to license adaptations, etc.—should he be liable for 
such action? Relatedly, if a fiduciary adheres to these instructions, could 
he nevertheless still be liable for a breach of fiduciary duty? How willing 
should courts be to modify or terminate such provisions? In order to 
address these questions, this Part considers both the justifications for 
long-term post-death controls over property more generally and the 
corresponding justifications for interfering with such controls. It also 
evaluates relevant legislative and judicial activity outside of the realm of 
intellectual property. In Part III, I will apply the lessons from this 
exploration to the particular context of artistic instructions. 
A. Justifications for Dead-Hand Control 
The Restatement (Third) of Property underscores that U.S. “law does 
not grant courts any general authority to question the wisdom, fairness, 
or reasonableness of the donor’s decisions about how to allocate his or 
her property.”120 Indeed, “[p]roperty owners have the nearly unrestricted 
right to dispose of their property as they please.”121 Over time, 
commentators have assembled a bustling laundry list of justifications for 
this general principle of testamentary freedom, including that it comports 
with natural law, generates wealth accumulation, promotes industry and 
                                                     
119. O’Neill, supra note 116, at 30. 
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003); see also id. § 10.1 (“The donor’s intention is given effect to the maximum 
extent allowed by law.”). 
121. Id. § 10.1 cmt. a. 
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productivity, fosters happiness, reinforces family ties, and provides the 
simplest solution for disposing of property at an owner’s death.122 
Daniel Kelly, for example, draws upon an economic or functional 
approach to testamentary freedom, which “emphasizes the ‘social 
welfare’ of the parties and seeks to determine how the law can create the 
best incentives for the donor, donees, and other parties that a donor’s 
disposition of property may affect.”123 He argues that “effectuating a 
donor’s ex ante interests is often consistent with maximizing social 
welfare” largely for the reasons just listed.124 And, he extends this 
analysis in support of trust law—the primary vehicle for facilitating 
dead-hand control—which historically has revolved around the intent of 
the settlor.125 By contrast, Kirsten Rabe Smolensky emphasizes the 
dignity or autonomy interests of the dead as a basis for according what 
she terms “posthumous rights.”126 
While such attempts to mount a unified theory in favor of 
testamentary freedom are helpful, a discrete set of considerations is 
raised by the prospect of allowing individuals not only to dispose of 
their property at death but also to prescribe enforceable instructions as to 
its treatment over time—that is, by the prospect of dead-hand control.127 
Specifically, a number of the aforementioned justifications for plain-
vanilla testamentary freedom are less persuasive as bases for dead-hand 
control. In their seminal article, Adam Hirsch and William Wang argue, 
for example, that premising such control on the fostering of family ties 
among remote family members who do not know each other is not 
persuasive.128 Likewise, the notion that an ancestor possesses knowledge 
superior to that of the state concerning the needs of his descendants—the 
                                                     
122. E.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Succession—Its Past, Future and Justification, in DEATH, 
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 3, 5 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977); Tritt, supra note 46, at 117. 
“A compelling argument in favor of [testamentary freedom] is that it accords with human wishes.” 
LEWIS M. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 21 (1955). 
123. Daniel B. Kelly, Restricting Testamentary Freedom: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications, 
82 FORDHAM L. REV. 1125, 1135 (2013). 
124. Id. at 1137. 
125. See id. at 1134 (collecting sources). 
126. Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Rights of the Dead, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 774–75 (2009) 
(adopting an “Interest Theory” approach “because it acknowledges that the dead can have interests 
that survive death”). 
127. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 711 (9th ed. 2014) 
(describing dead-hand control as arising “when death does not result in a clean transfer to living 
persons that permits them to do with the money as they please”); supra note 48 and accompanying 
text. 
128. Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 
1, 15–16 (1992). 
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“father knows best” hypothesis129—is less compelling when the ancestor 
is not a parent, but a great-great grandparent.130 And it can hardly be said 
that giving effect to long-ago created future interests (or analogously 
imposed restrictions131) is the simplest method for disposing of 
property.132 What remains, Hirsch and Wang submit, is the productivity-
incentive justification, which can—in theory—justify the enforcement of 
future interests or like mechanisms to the extent that their availability 
stimulates the amassing of greater fortunes by donors.133 
Writing separately, Hirsch has also addressed the particular context of 
bequests that have as a goal something other than the financial welfare 
of individuals.134 He points out that testators sometimes have purposes in 
mind that fall in between, on the one hand, charitable purposes (favored 
under the law) and, on the other, capricious or detrimental purposes 
(disfavored).135 The middle category includes “bequests for an amalgam 
of purposes perceived neither to help nor to harm the public.”136 
Arguably, many of the artistic restrictions described above would fall 
into that middle category137 because they appear to be about more than 
the mere financial betterment of the beneficiaries. Rather, the decedent 
authors seem to have a particular purpose—an artistic purpose—in mind. 
                                                     
129. Id. at 12. 
130. Id. at 15. Along similar lines, Joshua Tate argues that incentive trusts might be justified on 
the father-knows-best principle where the beneficiaries are known to the settlor. Joshua C. Tate, 
Conditional Love: Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem, 41 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 
445, 485–86 (2006). 
131. See generally Molly S. Van Houweling, The Dead Hand of Copyright 13–31 (Oct. 7, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing a range of non-possessory use 
restrictions and limitations thereon). 
132. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 15. 
133. Id. at 16; accord Tate, supra note 130, at 486; cf. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 52 (“[T]he 
opportunity to make bequests for purposes may be of no small interest and concern to testators.”). 
134. See generally Hirsch, supra note 115; see also Richard C. Ausness, Non-Charitable Purpose 
Trusts: Past, Present, and Future, 51 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 321 (2016). 
135. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 34; see also Tamara York, Protecting Minor Children from 
Parental Disinheritance: A Proposal for Awarding a Compulsory Share of the Parental Estate, 
1997 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 861, 878–79 (“Where the testator’s provision is merely 
capricious and the performance . . . will benefit no one, the courts will not compel its execution, 
despite the wishes of the testator.”). 
136. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 34. 
137. See supra section I.D. It is not entirely clear whether, in Hirsch’s terminology, the gifts 
covered by the artistic restrictions described in section I.D. would best be described as bequests to 
persons, with a use-restriction tacked on, or as what Hirsch conceives of as classic bequests for 
purposes (and if the latter, whether they would be deemed bequests for “social” or “personal” 
purposes). See Hirsch, supra note 115, at 51–52 (discussing the distinctions). If they are bequests to 
persons, he argues, the restrictions would more likely be enforceable. Id. at 102.  
11 - Subotnik.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/21/2017  3:09 PM 
278 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:253 
 
Hirsch argues that bequests for purposes are also justified on the 
productivity-incentive thesis. In particular, testators gain personal 
satisfaction from directing their wealth at projects they care about,138 
including those that are very personal in nature—such as preserving 
one’s memory or providing a reminder that one was here.139 These sorts 
of bequests may also reflect our emotional ties to our property: “just as 
we wish to provide for loved ones after we are gone, so may we strive to 
ensure, for similar if not identical reasons, that treasured objects are 
protected.”140 
David Horton develops these themes in arguing that dead-hand 
control provides a valuable means of self-expression, which allows the 
testator to communicate how he wishes to be remembered.141 The case 
that animates Horton’s article is that of deceased Chicago dentist Max 
Feinberg, who, as he grew older, “became preoccupied with the high rate 
of intermarriage among young Jews and with his own family’s 
gravitation toward other cultures and traditions.”142 Shortly before his 
death, Feinberg “insert[ed] a restriction into his trust: ‘A descendant of 
mine . . . who marries outside the Jewish faith . . . shall be deemed to be 
deceased for all purposes of this instrument . . . .’”143 When, two decades 
later, Feinberg’s grandchildren grew disenchanted with the “Jewish 
clause,” they challenged its validity in court.144 The Illinois Supreme 
Court unanimously upheld Feinberg’s wishes.145 Horton favors such 
enhanced willingness to effectuate testamentary provisions—to which he 
                                                     
138. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 53 (noting that, in comparison to the case for bequests to persons, 
“when a testator makes a bequest for a social purpose, her utility may derive from a more diffuse 
association with the undefined group that benefits”). 
139. Id. at 56. 
140. Id. at 57; see also Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 
959 (1982) (discussing the sorts of “objects [that] are closely bound up with personhood”). 
141. Horton, supra note 47, at 78; see also Hirsch, supra note 115, at 53–54. Horton, while 
recognizing the distinction between outright dispositions at death and dead-hand control, would 
extend this justification to both. See Horton, supra note 47, at 63–64 & n.17, 78 (distinguishing 
between posthumous conditions and bequests for purposes, on the one hand, and mere distributional 
choices, on the other). 
142. Horton, supra note 47, at 62. 
143. Id. (citation omitted). 
144. Id. 
145. In re Estate of Feinberg, 919 N.E.2d 888, 905–06 (Ill. 2009). In effect this is so, although the 
facts were complicated and also turned on his surviving wife’s exercise of a power of appointment. 
See id. at 892. For more discussion of this kind of restriction, see infra notes 208–11 and 
accompanying text. 
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would sometimes afford First Amendment protections146—because of 
their expressive nature: they serve as “a ringing declaration of [a 
testator’s] core beliefs.”147 
This expressiveness can turn up in more ordinary contexts. For 
example, Horton invokes a hypothetical (originally formulated by John 
Langbein148) about a long-term IBM employee who instructs his trustees 
not to sell his large block of IBM stock because of his high esteem for, 
and loyalty to, the company.149 Horton argues that a chief reason to 
uphold such a bequest is its communicative dimension—it allows the 
employee to express himself and to comment on his life.150 
Each of these justifications—serving as an incentive to productivity, 
providing personal satisfaction, preserving one’s memory, reflecting 
emotional ties to one’s authored works, and constituting a means of self-
expression—could plausibly justify dead-hand control over intellectual 
property, as an initial matter. Nevertheless, it is clear that there are real 
costs associated with dead-hand control. As I discuss next, these costs 
counsel in favor of caution and, in some cases, regulation by the state.151 
B. Justifications for Regulating Dead-Hand Control 
Hirsch and Wang reasonably contend that “[a]s a matter of public 
policy, lawmakers should consider not only for how long but also in 
what ways a testator proposes to control property after her death.”152 
This begs the question: when is regulation of control by a dead hand 
warranted? Commentators have carved up the landscape along various 
dimensions. One approach would consider, qualitatively or categorically, 
                                                     
146. Horton, supra note 47, at 89. Horton acknowledges that state interference with these 
provisions does not amount to suppression in the sense that it denies the testator or settlor the ability 
to speak. Id. at 67, 98, 101. Nevertheless, he argues that at least some restrictions do trigger First 
Amendment scrutiny because “the ultimate distribution of a decedent’s property and testamentary 
self-expression are more tightly entwined than they first seem.” Id. at 67. 
147. Id. at 66. 
148. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 
1112–13 (2004) [hereinafter Langbein, Mandatory Rules]; John H. Langbein, The Uniform Prudent 
Investor Act and the Future of Trust Investing, 81 IOWA L. REV. 641, 664 (1996) [hereinafter 
Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act].  
149. Horton, supra note 47, at 107–08. 
150. See id. Horton also argues that expressive values help explain the contexts in which courts 
do and do not permit a testator’s purpose to be upheld. See id. at 103–04. 
151. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 17; Horton, supra note 47, at 102; Kelly, supra note 
123, at 1138.  
152. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 4; see also Eric Rakowski, The Future Reach of the 
Disembodied Will, 4 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 91, 96–98 (2005) (addressing this distinction). 
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the proposed form of control. Hirsch and Wang, for example, distinguish 
among restrictions on the subsequent use, investment, or distribution of 
property.153 
Use restrictions, because they “can directly impair the value of 
property,” are “powerful and draining,”154 “resulting [in the] suboptimal 
use of resources.”155 These sorts of restrictions stand in contrast to 
distribution restrictions—that is, imposed allocations among groups of 
beneficiaries—which have wealth consequences that derive from more 
nebulous transaction costs and risk-aversion considerations.156 
Accordingly, a stronger “case can be made for regulating use restrictions 
more stringently than distribution restrictions.”157 
With respect to investment restrictions, Hirsch and Wang argue that 
“[w]hen a testator places a future interest in trust, beneficiaries and 
society both profit by the property’s enhanced marketability.”158 Given 
evidence of risk aversion in most people, instructions to a trustee to 
diversify trust investments would likely accord with the preferences of 
most beneficiaries, and should be enforceable.159 “By contrast, were the 
testator (perversely) to mandate investment concentration, thereby 
heightening risk, most beneficiaries would likely agree that dead hand 
control was worth paying to avoid.”160 Accordingly, “[d]iminished value 
                                                     
153. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 4. The first two categories, use and investment, are more 
salient for present purposes. 
154. Id. at 50. Hirsch and Wang, it must be said, do repeatedly acknowledge the existence of use 
restrictions aimed at shaping the use of a particular asset rather than constraining the beneficiaries’ 
behavior for their own benefit. Cf. id. at 21 n.76 (“The testator’s concern, in other words, might not 
be (only) that the beneficiary use his inheritance in a certain way, but that Blackacre itself be used in 
a certain way.” (emphasis in original)). Accordingly, “[f]or a few testators, . . . particular pieces of 
property may have sentimental value, which could increase their subjective preference for a legal 
use restriction and compensate to some degree for its added social cost.” Id. at 20–21. 
155. Id. at 22; accord Rakowski, supra note 152, at 104. Hirsch and Wang posit this justification 
for intervention whether the utilitarian maxim is wealth maximization or a broader view of social 
welfare enhancement. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 24. 
156. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 50. “While the prospect of arbitrariness provides a 
rationale for their limitation, intergenerational distribution restrictions also bring benefits in the form of 
increased wealth conservation. Viewed broadly, distribution restrictions appear less burdensome than 
restrictions that funnel wealth into the provision of specific goods and services.” Id. 
157. Id. Hirsch and Wang suggest several possibilities, such as including specific durational 
limits under the Rule Against Perpetuities aimed at use restrictions; rendering them unenforceable 
after a certain period; imposing additional estate tax consequences; or facilitating modification. See 
id. at 51. 
158. Id. at 52. 
159. See id. at 31. 
160. Id. at 32. Hirsch and Wang do acknowledge that restrictions to preserve certain assets might 
be imposed out of sentimental attachment. Id. at 28 n.105. 
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and arbitrariness would continue to justify the regulation of such 
trusts.”161 These points together accord with Hirsch’s separately 
articulated view that bequests for purposes that are socially injurious 
justify intervention.162 
Smolensky, who, as previously mentioned, largely favors posthumous 
rights on dignity and autonomy grounds, also recognizes the need for 
limits. “[I]nterests that ‘can no longer be helped or harmed by 
posthumous events,’ such as a secret desire for personal achievement, 
die upon the death of the interest-holder.”163 Her preferred limitations—
based on trends she identifies in the case law—would consider the 
impossibility of giving effect to the right,164 the importance of the 
right,165 the passage of time,166 and the degree of conflict of interest 
between the living and the dead.167 
Another tack would divide the world of regulatory justifications along 
the dimension of time into two camps, ex ante and ex post.168 For Daniel 
Kelly, for instance, only ex ante bases are justifiable from an economic 
perspective because ex post considerations do not take into consideration 
the “donor’s happiness during life, the donor’s incentive to work, save, 
and invest, and the structure and timing of a donor’s gifts.”169 If donors 
sense that courts will not effectuate their intent, he argues, they will be 
less likely to work and save in the first place, and they will have less to 
pass on at death.170 Furthermore, donees as a class will suffer under ex 
post meddling, even if it appears rational to do so in a given case, 
because donors will be less inclined to generate and pass on the same 
amount.171 
                                                     
161. Id. at 52. 
162. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 70, 83. 
163. Smolensky, supra note 126, at 771–72 (quoting Joel Feinberg, Harm and Self-Interest, in 
RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 45, 64–65 
(1980)). 
164. Id. at 775. 
165. Id. at 781. 
166. Id. at 789. 
167. Id. at 791. 
168. Binaries are common in this area of scholarship (as in so many others). See, e.g., Gregory S. 
Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 
1189, 1257 (1985) (distinguishing between social and economic justifications for regulation of 
dead-hand control). 
169. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1129. Kelly acknowledges that while his view privileges ex ante 
considerations as a basis for interfering with testamentary freedom, that is a different question from 
“whether intervention is socially desirable.” Id. at 1157 n.205.  
170. Id. at 1151, 1167. 
171. Id. at 1167–68. 
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Kelly therefore deems only the existence of imperfect information, 
negative externalities, and intergenerational equity concerns as 
legitimate bases for intervening in donative transfers at death because 
these take into account the donor’s ex ante perspective.172 It should be 
noted, however, that the first of these exceptions threatens to swallow 
the rule because, by definition, testators are always acting with imperfect 
information.173 In any event, Kelly would rule out as illegitimate both 
intervening to maximize the donees’ ex post interests and downplaying 
what are perceived as idiosyncratic preferences by donors.174 “In short, 
the living may themselves benefit if the law allows a certain degree of 
dead hand control.”175 
In highly influential scholarship, John Langbein has colorfully argued 
that the “characteristic sphere for the application of the anti-dead-hand 
rule has been the fringe world of the eccentric settlor: the crackpot who 
wants to brick up her house, or build statues of himself, or dictate 
children’s marital choices.”176 Langbein maintains that the most 
persuasive basis for interfering with dead-hand control is “fundamentally 
a change-of-circumstances doctrine”: 
The living donor can always change his or her mind, as he or she 
observes the consequences of an unwise course of conduct, or as 
other circumstances change, but the settlor who is deceased or 
who, though living, occupies a decedent-like relationship to the 
trust by having made the trust’s terms irrevocable cannot.177 
While this view in some respects could accord with Kelly’s preferred 
basis for regulation (an ex ante perspective that accounts for, say, 
imperfect information at the time of drafting), it is clear that Langbein’s 
focal point is the welfare of the beneficiaries. Ultimately, he posits, 
restraints on dead-hand control largely reflect the principle that trusts 
must be for the benefit of the beneficiaries: 
The rule against capricious purposes deals with the easy cases 
(‘caprice’ means whim or sudden fancy), but leaves the 
                                                     
172. Id. at 1128. 
173. Kelly himself recognizes this inevitability in the will or trust drafting context. Id. at 1160. 
174. Id. at 1165. Kelly and Hirsch share common ground here. See Hirsch, supra note 115, at 78 
(“[A] testator’s motives for ‘capricious’ purpose bequests may well prove substantial after all—no 
less so than those underlying other ones of the ‘normal’ variety.”). 
175. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1185. 
176. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1111. As he predicted, however, “the 
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule [may also] set limits upon a more common form of settlor direction, 
the value-impairing investment instruction.” Id. 
177. Id.; accord STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 70–71 
(2004). 
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underlying policy unexpressed. By refashioning the rule to spell 
out that a valid trust must benefit the beneficiaries, the Third 
Restatement and the [Uniform Trust] Code articulate the policy 
that has been at work in these cases. . . . [A] trust must advance 
“the interests of the beneficiaries of the trust.”178 
For that reason, with respect to his previously discussed example of 
the IBM employee’s instruction to retain stock,179 Langbein himself 
would strike such a provision under the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule.180 
This is because “[m]odern portfolio theory instructs us that the investor 
who diversifies thoroughly virtually always improves the odds of doing 
better than a one-stock portfolio, regardless of what the stock is.”181 
There has not, however, been universal approval of the benefit-the-
beneficiaries restriction on trust investment. Significantly, Jeffrey 
Cooper has taken it to task and argued that “[r]ather than a simple update 
of a single rule of trust law, the benefit-the-beneficiaries rule is a 
distinctly modern doctrine that combines selected strands of multiple 
traditional rules of trust law.”182 He argues that the benefit-the-
beneficiaries rule represents a drastic departure from settled law favoring 
the intent of the settlor, especially in the area of investment directives.183 
Thus, he would be more willing to uphold the IBM stock retention 
directive where the settlor is acting less out of loyalty than out of a 
conviction that under-diversification would maximize investment 
returns.184 Nevertheless, even Cooper acknowledges that there are 
circumstances in which testamentary intent may be overridden, 
                                                     
178. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1108 (quoting Colonial Trust Co. v. Brown, 
135 A. 555, 564 (Conn. 1926) (internal quotation marks omitted) (footnotes omitted)); accord John 
H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power to Direct Investments, 
90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 377, 383 (2010) [hereinafter Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?] (“What the 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code have done in articulating the benefit-the-
beneficiaries standard is simply to clarify that long implicit principle.”). 
179. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text. 
180. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 386. 
181. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1113 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 227 cmts. e, g, at 19–24, 25–28 (AM. LAW INST. 1992)); id. 
(“Failure to diversify imposes upon the portfolio what is called uncompensated risk, risk that can be 
costlessly avoided by spreading the investment across many asset classes and many distinct security 
issues.”); Langbein, Uniform Prudent Investor Act, supra note 148, at 646–49; see also Langbein, 
Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 387. 
182. Jeffrey A. Cooper, Shades of Gray: Applying the Benefit-the-Beneficiaries Rule to Trust 
Investment Directives, 90 B.U. L. REV. 2383, 2386 (2010). 
183. Id. at 2393, 2395. 
184. Id. at 2397; see also Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, the Uniform Trust 
Code, and the Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1175 (2008). 
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including rare cases in which public policy dictates as much.185 He 
seems to favor continued judicial balancing of the interests, which could, 
in principle, result in a ruling contrary to the settlor’s intent.186 
A few things might be said at this juncture. Hirsch and Wang’s 
concerns about use and investment restrictions187 could readily map onto 
many of the authorial instructions described above.188 A prohibition on 
adaptations, for example, could be considered a restriction on the use of 
an authored work or, additionally, a restriction on investment to the 
extent that the fiduciary is hindered from exploiting the work’s full 
economic value. Smolensky’s categories are also useful here:189 while 
impossibility would not typically be relevant, the importance of the 
right, the passage of time, and the seriousness of the conflict between the 
living and the dead would all seem to be so, with one caveat discussed 
below.190 
For his part, Kelly acknowledges that giving effect to a donor’s ex 
ante interests will not always maximize social welfare. He admits, for 
instance, that sometimes “effectuating a donor’s interests may conflict 
with maximizing social welfare, i.e., restricting testamentary freedom 
may decrease the donor’s utility, but the decrease might be outweighed 
by an increase in the donee’s utility.”191 In addition, while he does not 
view the discounting of idiosyncratic instructions as a cogent reason for 
intervening, he would justify intervention to the extent that those same 
instructions caused negative externalities,192 a situation that may occur 
with artistic restrictions. Finally, while taking opposite positions on the 
benefit-the-beneficiaries rule, Langbein and Cooper both acknowledge 
the need for room to deviate from testamentary intent.193 Langbein’s 
prism suggests that if constraints are justified in this context, it will often 
                                                     
185. Cooper, supra note 182, at 2391 (“Courts traditionally have set aside trust investment 
directives on public policy grounds solely when the settlor attempts to mandate a degree of waste 
that a well-ordered society cannot tolerate.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
186. Id. at 2400. 
187. See supra notes 153–61 and accompanying text. 
188. See supra section I.D. 
189. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
190. See infra notes 316 and 318 and accompanying text. 
191. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1157 n.205. In a seemingly related vein (Kelly acknowledges that 
the issues are related, id.), Kelly distinguishes economic from social desirability, and he 
acknowledges that the dictates of one might diverge from the other. For example, he seems to 
concede that “[f]rom an ex post perspective, restricting testamentary freedom in order to maximize 
the donees’ interests would be socially desirable.” Id. at 1167. 
192. Id. at 1169. 
193. See supra notes 176–81, 185–86 and accompanying text. 
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be the beneficiaries’ interests—and not society’s interests more 
generally—that will provide the constraints.194 Cooper, by contrast, 
would justify incursion into testamentary intent primarily where 
society’s interests are at stake195 as well as to further the settlor’s 
ultimate goals.196 In many instances of authorial control, all of these are 
the very interests that hang in the balance. 
C. Legal Treatment of Dead-Hand Control 
It remains to consider the current state of the law. As a starting point, 
the Restatement (Third) of Property provides that “American law 
curtails freedom of disposition only to the extent that the donor attempts 
to make a disposition or achieve a purpose that is prohibited or restricted 
by an overriding rule of law.”197 It sets out a non-exhaustive list of such 
circumstances: 
Among the rules of law that prohibit or restrict freedom of 
disposition in certain instances are those relating to spousal 
rights; creditors’ rights; unreasonable restraints on alienation or 
marriage; provisions promoting separation or divorce; 
impermissible racial or other categoric restrictions; provisions 
encouraging illegal activity; and the rules against perpetuities 
and accumulations.198 
Since the legal landscape covered by this motley group is vast, in this 
section I will focus on trends of note, which point toward both more and 
less deference to testamentary intent. 
1. Enhanced Deference to Testamentary Intent 
A number of recent trends point in the direction of enhanced 
deference to testator intent, which would potentially favor posthumous 
artistic control. One of the most prominent trends is the scaling back of 
the once mighty Rule Against Perpetuities (“RAP”). The RAP limits 
                                                     
194. See supra notes 178–81 and accompanying text. 
195. Cooper, supra note 182, at 2391. 
196. Cooper, supra note 184, at 1170, 1213. 
197. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 cmt. c 
(AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
198. Id. The Uniform Trust Code and Uniform Probate Code are to similar effect. See UNIF. 
TRUST CODE § 404 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000) (“A trust may be created only to the extent its 
purposes are lawful, not contrary to public policy, and possible to achieve. A trust and its terms 
must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”); UNIF. PROB. CODE §§ 2-201 to -214 (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2010) (elective share rights for surviving spouses); id. §§ 2-901 to -905 (Rule Against 
Perpetuities); id. §§ 3-801 to -816 (creditor rights). 
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trust duration to roughly one hundred years.199 But it has now been 
abolished in approximately twenty-one jurisdictions.200 In these states, 
settlors of trusts are free to micromanage the vesting of property 
interests indefinitely.201 While the reasons for this shift are complex and 
include competition among states to lure wealthy trust business,202 the 
upshot is increased deference to long-dead settlors. 
Another trend is the apparent uptick in so-called “incentive trusts,” 
that is, trusts that “attach fixed conditions on distributions . . . that leave 
less discretion to the trustee.”203 Ranging from “provisions requiring the 
beneficiaries to graduate from college, achieve a certain grade point 
average, or earn a certain amount of income in order to qualify for 
distributions from the trust,” these sorts of clauses have seemed to gain 
traction.204 Some incentive trusts even feature moral or religious or 
family-oriented goals established by the settlor.205 By their nature, these 
sorts of restraints raise the very real possibility that the trusts will prove 
inflexible as circumstances develop.206 Nevertheless, given the types of 
the goals they set out to accomplish, a case can be made that courts 
should be less willing to modify or terminate these sorts of trusts.207 
While the marketing and terminology of incentive trusts is relatively 
new, courts have long enforced certain conditions to the receipt of funds 
by beneficiaries.208 Such conditions have been used, for example, to 
                                                     
199. See, e.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 880. 
200. Horton, supra note 47, at 64 n.18 (assembling jurisdictions as of 2012).  
201. Id. at 64 (“Settlors in these [non-RAP] states can now write their estate plans on a canvas the 
size of eternity.”). 
202. See generally Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1314–16 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional 
Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 
373–78 (2005); Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: R.I.P. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 2097, 2100–05 (2003). 
203. Tate, supra note 130, at 448. 
204. Id. 
205. See, e.g., id. at 458 (“[C]ommon provisions offer a financial incentive for a beneficiary who 
leaves the workplace to stay at home with young children or marries a stay-at-home parent.”). One 
amusing provision would distribute “$10,000 upon the first marriage of each descendant of mine, 
provided that the new spouse has never gone to law school.” Id. at 457–58 (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting John J. Scroggin, Family Incentive Trusts, J. FIN. SERV. PROF’LS, at 74, 87 
(2000)). 
206. Id. at 449. 
207. Id. at 491. 
208. Gareth H. Jones, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY 
PROPERTY 119, 120 (Edward C. Halbach, Jr. ed., 1977) (agreeing but also acknowledging that 
courts, by longstanding tradition, will not uphold “conditions which are criminal, tortious, or 
otherwise contrary to public policy”). 
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encourage the marriage of a beneficiary to a spouse of a particular 
religion.209 These have been upheld particularly where the condition is 
viewed merely as a partial restraint upon marriage (rather than as a 
restraint on marriage altogether or on religious practice).210 
Commentators have taken opposing views on the enforceability of these 
sort of conditions.211 
Another visible trend reflecting deference to testators is the rise of 
“honorary trusts,” which allow decedents to designate property for 
particular non-charitable purposes that provide no benefit to an 
ascertainable human beneficiary. Classic examples include cemetery 
upkeep and the care of beloved pets.212 Early on, the legal status of these 
sorts of bequests was uncertain because they did not name a human 
beneficiary with legal standing to enforce the trust’s terms—a stalwart 
requirement for an enforceable trust.213 Subsequently, however, the 
Restatement of Trusts in 1935 explicitly blessed the concept of an 
honorary (or intended) trust, which is not actually an enforceable trust 
but is rather “treated as a power, which the intended trustee may carry 
out if she so chooses; otherwise, the residuary legatee or heirs can sue 
for a resulting trust to recover the corpus of the bequest.”214 Thus, under 
contemporary common law principles, the intended trustee can care for 
Fido if she wishes although she cannot be compelled to do so.215 
Additionally, most states have enacted an array of specific laws, which 
                                                     
209. See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825, 826–32 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1974) 
(construing a will that imposed a requirement that the putative beneficiary marry “a Jewish girl 
whose both parents were Jewish” in order to receive his bequest); In re Estate of Keffalas, 233 A.2d 
248, 250–51 (Pa. 1967) (upholding bequests “on condition that such child marry one of ‘true Greek 
blood and descent and of Orthodox religion’”). 
210. Shapira, 315 N.E.2d at 829; Keffalas, 233 A.2d at 250; accord Jones, supra note 208, at 
126–27. On the validity of bequests conditioned on specific religious practice, see Smolensky, 
supra note 126, at 793 n.135. 
211. Compare Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1315 (2011) (largely favoring enforcement of such conditions), with Sherman, supra note 48, at 
1329 (arguing that “[t]estamentary conditions calculated to restrain legatees’ personal conduct 
should not be enforced”). 
212. E.g., In re Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d 779, 781–82 (Ohio Ct. App. 1950); Frances H. 
Foster, Should Pets Inherit?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 801, 816–17 (2011); Hirsch, supra note 115, at 45. 
213. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 42–44 (describing the varying treatment of such bequests by 
nineteenth century courts). They were also problematic under the Rule Against Perpetuities, id., 
particularly in the case of pets, because pets could not serve as “measuring lives,” Foster, supra note 
212, at 817. 
214. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 44–46; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2003). 
215. E.g., Searight’s Estate, 95 N.E.2d at 782.  
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diverge from traditional trust requirements, to further ensure the carrying 
out of these sorts of bequests.216 
2. Decreased Deference to Testamentary Intent 
At the same time, however, there are also trends pointing away from 
deference to testamentary intent, which would potentially disfavor 
posthumous artistic control.217 Indeed, some have suggested that the rise 
of the perpetual trust (that is, the decline of the RAP) has required 
corresponding flexibility elsewhere.218 One area where this loosening of 
testamentary control is most prominent is in the realm of trust 
termination and modification. 
Once upon a time in the United States,219 it was difficult to modify the 
terms of a trust or terminate it altogether. In the leading case of Claflin v. 
Claflin,220 the settlor had established a trust to pay one of his sons ten 
thousand dollars periodically and the balance when he turned thirty.221 
Clearly chafing at the fact that his brother had received property outright 
when he had not, the beneficiary (not yet twenty-five) brought a lawsuit 
to obtain the principal.222 
In rejecting this request, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
struck a longstanding blow for testamentary freedom. While 
acknowledging that the beneficiary’s “interest in the trust fund is vested 
and absolute, and that no other person has any interest in it,”223 the Court 
nevertheless deferred to the wishes of the settlor. It reasoned that this 
                                                     
216. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-8.1 (2010) (honorary trusts for pets); id. 
§ 8-1.5 (trusts for cemetery purposes); UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 408–09 (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000); 
Foster, supra note 212, at 835. These approaches are meant to reassure testators such as Leona 
Helmsley, whose $12 million bequest to her beloved Maltese dog, Trouble, caused much of the 
same. See, e.g., Foster, supra note 212, at 802. But they should also reassure more ordinary folk, 
since “[a]ccording to recent studies, 27% of American pet owners who have wills include their pets 
in their wills.” Id. at 811. 
217. See, e.g., Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction of American Trust Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
215, 216 (2011); Kelly, supra note 123, at 1129 (arguing that factoring in ex post considerations is 
increasingly common); Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 
235, 236 (1996). 
218. See Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 202, at 1331. 
219. The treatment here has long diverged from that in the United Kingdom, which long ago 
broadened courts’ powers to modify or terminate trusts at the behest of the beneficiaries. E.g., 
Saunders v. Vautier, (1841) 49 Eng. Rep. 282 (Ch.); Kelly, supra note 123, at 1176–77; Tate, supra 
note 130, at 466. 
220. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). 
221. Id. at 455. 
222. See id. 
223. Id. 
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was not a situation in which the trust was merely passive,224 contravened 
a rule of law or public policy, or had seen its mission accomplished.225 
Indeed, with respect to the latter, it was precisely this scenario that the 
settlor had anticipated.226 Interestingly, aside from paying deference to 
testamentary intent, the Court apparently still felt the need to speak to 
the objective merits of the provision, noting that “there is not the same 
danger that [the beneficiary] will spend the property while it is in the 
hands of the trustees as there would be if it were in his own.”227 
The Claflin doctrine (or rule), as it came to be known—that is, the 
idea that “a trust cannot be terminated [or modified] prior to the time 
fixed for termination, even if all the beneficiaries consent, if termination 
[or modification] would be contrary to a material purpose of the 
settlor”228—was widely adopted in other jurisdictions.229 Robert Sitkoff, 
departing from the thrust of Langbein’s approach, has argued that the 
settlor, rather than the beneficiaries, is the principal to whom the trustee 
is an agent.230 An upside to Claflin, he suggests, is that it “helps align the 
interests of the settlor and the trustee.”231 
More recently, however, law reformers have advocated for increasing 
flexibility with respect to trust modification and termination.232 
Specifically, the Uniform Trust Code (“UTC”),233 codified in 2000, and 
some states have eased the ability of beneficiaries to modify or terminate 
a trust.234 The UTC distinguishes between two types of triggering 
events. First, where all of the beneficiaries consent, courts may modify 
or even terminate a trust as long as that action would not be 
“inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust.”235 While this 
                                                     
224. In the words of the court, a “dry trust,” meaning trustee had no duties other than to hold the 
property. Id. 
225. Id. at 455–56. 
226. See id. at 456. 
227. Id. 
228. Tate, supra note 130, at 468. John Langbein, as part of his systematic effort to highlight the 
ways in which trust law has always been “beneficiary-regarding,” Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, 
supra note 178, at 385, applies that approach to material purpose doctrine as well. “Under the 
material purpose doctrine, the court asks whether a disputed trust term has a purpose that is material 
to the best interests of the beneficiaries of that trust.” Id. at 382. 
229. Tate, supra note 130, at 468; see also Alexander, supra note 168, at 1204. 
230. Sitkoff, supra note 24, at 624, 648. 
231. Id. at 659. 
232. See id. at 660. 
233. See UNIF. TRUST CODE (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000). 
234. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403(b) (West 2017); Horton, supra note 47, at 77 (arguing 
that this trend reflects “a concern that stems, in part, from a desire to minimize economic waste”). 
235.  UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b). 
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provision gives leeway to courts to make amendments, Joshua Tate 
nevertheless sees some continuing vitality for settlor intent because the 
settlor’s “material purpose” will trump any proposed changes.236 
Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts goes even further in 
facilitating opportunities for modification or termination.237 It explicitly 
allows courts to balance the settlor’s purposes against the beneficiaries’ 
reasons for seeking the change.238 
Second, even without unanimous consent by the beneficiaries, the 
UTC permits courts to make changes in the face of unanticipated 
circumstances—under the equitable deviation doctrine.239 Specifically, 
courts “may modify the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust or 
terminate the trust if, because of circumstances not anticipated by the 
settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of the 
trust.”240 The need to “further the purposes of the trust” might once 
again seem to prioritize the settlor’s objectives, especially because the 
provision continues on to state that “[t]o the extent practicable, the 
modification must be made in accordance with the settlor’s probable 
intention.”241 Nevertheless, since the modification and termination 
provisions are mandatory by nature,242 settlor intent is inherently 
downplayed.243 
                                                     
236. Tate, supra note 130, at 470. 
237. It provides that “the beneficiaries cannot compel [a trust’s] termination or modification . . . 
after the settlor’s death, [except] with authorization of the court if it determines that the reason(s) for 
termination or modification outweigh the material purpose.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 65(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003). The beneficiaries must be unanimous in their consent to the 
modification or termination. Id. § 65(1). 
238. Tate, supra note 130, at 473. And, it reflects a vast shift in thinking from the Restatement 
(Second) of Trusts, which had provided—in accordance with Claflin—that “[i]f the continuance of 
the trust is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its 
termination.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (AM. LAW INST. 1959); id. § 167 cmt. b 
(rejecting as a basis for deviation “merely [that] such deviation would be more advantageous to the 
beneficiaries than . . . compliance”). 
239. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also has an equitable deviation provision similar to that of 
the UTC. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 (2003). This doctrine has a long history, 
stemming back at least as far as a trust set up by Joseph Pulitzer. See In re Pulitzer’s Estate, 249 
N.Y.S. 87, 89–91 (Surr. Ct. 1931), aff’d mem., 260 N.Y.S. 975 (App. Div. 1932). 
240. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a). The UTC also provides that a “court may modify the 
administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be 
impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.” Id. § 412(b). This also reflects the 
principle that trusts (and their terms) “must be for the benefit of [their] beneficiaries.” Id. § 412 cmt. 
241. Id. § 412(a); see also Sitkoff, supra note 24, at 661 (“[T]hese liberalizations are designed to 
advance the settlors’ probable intent.”); Tate, supra note 130, at 471. 
242. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(4). 
243. This is because such provisions cannot be overridden by contrary instructions in the trust. 
Tate, supra note 130, at 471. In this way, while trust law was historically “regulated by merely 
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A final trend of note is the shift toward the benefit-the-beneficiaries 
rule, the theoretical underpinnings of which were discussed above.244 
Although still controversial, the UTC states that “[a] trust and its terms 
must be for the benefit of its beneficiaries.”245 So far, seventeen 
jurisdictions have adopted some version of this rule,246 and the “benefit-
the-beneficiaries” rule is made mandatory under the UTC.247 While the 
application of this provision is still unfolding, it has been suggested that 
“it may empower courts to strike down any clause that could reduce the 
value of the trust.”248 For these reasons, David Horton has argued that 
“the future of trust law appears to revolve around preserving and 
enhancing the value of the corpus, leaving less and less space for 
testamentary individualism.”249 
III. ENFORCEABILITY OF POSTMORTEM ARTISTIC CONTROL 
We come to the heart of the matter. In some cases, analyzing the 
enforceability of postmortem artistic control is straightforward. Taking it 
from the top,250 the ability to dispose of one’s copyrights and tangible 
works by choosing one’s successors is, at this point in time, well-
accepted as a legal matter.251 I have argued elsewhere that such a policy 
does not in and of itself typically offend dead-hand control 
sensibilities.252 Likewise, the law obviously cannot—and should not—
prevent authors from setting examples through their own artistic 
                                                     
default rules of law,” Cooper, supra note 182, at 2385, the UTC assembled a number of mandatory 
“intent-defeating rules that restrict the settlor’s autonomy.” See Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra 
note 148, at 1105–06; cf. Ian Ayres, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 886 
(2003) (remarking on the UTC’s marked shift in including an array of mandatory rules). 
244. See supra notes 178–83 and accompanying text. 
245. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 404; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 27(2) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2003) (specifying that a “private trust, its terms, and its administration must be for the benefit 
of its beneficiaries”). 
246. Horton, supra note 47, at 77 n.116 (setting forth jurisdictions). 
247. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 105(b)(3).  
248. Horton, supra note 47, at 77.  
249. Id.; see also id. at 65 (“[T]he contours of testamentary freedom have become longer but 
thinner: the dead may be able to control their property forever, but they have less actual control over 
their property.”). 
250. See supra Part I. 
251. See supra section I.A. But see generally Desai, supra note 17 (arguing against the 
contemporary U.S. policy of postmortem copyrights). It is worth noting that the law on postmortem 
rights of publicity is still unfolding. E.g., Mark Bartholomew, A Right Is Born: Celebrity, Property, 
and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 315–17 (2011); Jennifer E. Rothman, The 
Inalienable Right of Publicity, 101 GEO. L.J. 185, 203–04 (2012). 
252. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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activities or from speaking with future successors or users about the 
posthumous exploitation of their works. While difficult moral and 
ethical issues surround the question of whether successors should carry 
out the wishes of deceased authors in these contexts,253 they remain just 
that: issues to be decided largely without legal ramifications. 
But with respect to the legal treatment of will or trust provisions that 
purport to wield artistic control, the analysis is different. The question is 
whether authors (and, a fortiori, subsequent owners) can validly bind 
their fiduciaries with respect to the treatment of literary property.254 This 
question, in turn, raises at least two sets of issues. The first is whether 
such instructions ought to be enforceable under state law—the system 
primarily charged with administering testamentary intent. The second is 
whether, above and beyond enforceability under state law, federal 
copyright policy ought to weigh in the balance, if not outright preempt 
state law on this front. Answering these questions obviously has great 
significance not just for the private parties involved, but also for the 
public. 
A. Reasons to Enforce Postmortem Artistic Control 
An argument can be made that the ability to control one’s works 
during the postmortem portion of the copyright term provides added 
inducement for the sort of productivity that is relevant to authors, 
namely, with respect to the production of creative works. In particular, 
the artistic instructions described above may facilitate the sorts of post-
death projects that provide great inspiration and personal satisfaction to 
authors during life.255 Just as with large charitable donations by the 
                                                     
253. Compare SAX, supra note 19, at 44 (acknowledging the internal conflicts faced by 
successors but arguing that absent “special circumstances”—for example, the author left no doubt 
about his wishes and was unable to perform the destructive act himself—the “grounds favoring 
preservation ought to prevail”), and Bilder, supra note 74, at 329–31 (arguing that, with the passage 
of time, such expressed wishes are a poor guarantor of authorial intent), with MILAN KUNDERA, 
TESTAMENTS BETRAYED: AN ESSAY IN NINE PARTS 268–69 (Linda Asher trans., 1995) 
(“[P]ublishing what the author deleted is the same act of rape as censoring what he decided to 
retain.”). 
254. For her part, Kate O’Neill suggests that such control is largely permissible:  
[T]he writer is in the best position to protect personal interests posthumously, if she chooses to 
do so, by selection of and directions to a trusted literary executor or trustee. Nothing prevents 
trustees from denying access to materials in their control and avoiding copyright issues 
altogether (unless such behavior would constitute mismanagement or possibly waste of the 
trust assets). In addition, the trustees may exploit the value of the copyrights in the works. 
Provided that the trust grants them the power, they may, if they so choose, license derivative 
works to the creators of their choosing and attach whatever contractual controls they negotiate.  
O’Neill, supra note 116, at 41. 
255. See supra notes 134–40 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch). 
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wealthy, ensuring that a work of art, music, or literature will be 
exploited in just the ways chosen by the author can serve to preserve the 
author’s memory or provide a reminder that she was here.256 
Furthermore, an author may have substantial emotional ties to her works 
and, as is the case with other property, she may be comforted knowing 
that those works will remain protected according to her vision257 and that 
privacy interests contained therein will not be compromised.258 
These possibilities can each be squared with the productivity-
incentive justification for dead-hand control, which is the most 
persuasive justification for some commentators.259 From that 
perspective, courts should be wary of interfering with authorial control 
by routinely preferring the ex post desires of the beneficiaries (or society 
at large) over the ex ante wishes of authors.260 As Steven Shavell puts it, 
“individuals who desire dead hand control will in fact suffer utility 
losses when they are alive, assuming that they anticipate that property 
will not be used in the way they want when they are dead.”261 These 
utility losses could, theoretically, translate into less lifetime creativity by 
authors, which would be detrimental to society. 
Effectuating artistic instructions may also uphold expressiveness and 
autonomy/dignity values in and of themselves.262 In a number of 
instances described above, authorial instructions can be characterized, in 
David Horton’s phrasing, as “self-regarding. [Decedents] do not just 
                                                     
256. See id.; cf. PAUL K. SAINT-AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
LITERARY IMAGINATION 128 (2003) (“Copyright may or may not contribute to the ‘immortality’ of 
an author after death; its more important and preposterous function is to make the author feel 
immortal before death.”). 
257. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. Plato, of course, equated authoring works to 
giving birth to children, which would explain the protective instinct. See PLATO, SYMPOSIUM 56–57 
(Alexander Nehamas & Paul Woodruff trans., 1989). See generally M.H. ABRAMS, THE MIRROR 
AND THE LAMP: ROMANTIC THEORY AND THE CRITICAL TRADITION (1953) (establishing the 
Romantic conception of the artist as creator). 
258. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 76. 
259. See supra note 133 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch and Wang). 
260. Kelly, supra note 123, at 1175–76; see also supra notes 169–75 and accompanying text 
(describing view of Kelly). 
261. SHAVELL, supra note 177, at 68; cf. William A. Drennan, Wills, Trusts, Schadenfreude, and 
the Wild, Wacky Right of Publicity: Exploring the Enforceability of Dead-Hand Restrictions, 58 
ARK. L. REV. 43, 104 (2005) (“A restriction prohibiting disgraceful uses of the decedent’s 
identity . . . . can provide a sense of comfort to the celebrity that after death her heirs will not 
disgrace her image or reputation and will take reasonable steps to prevent others from doing so.”). 
262. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing view of Smolensky); supra notes 
141–50 and accompanying text (describing view of Horton). 
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provide for their loved ones; they also comment on their lives.”263 For 
example, instructions that a fiduciary is not to authorize derivative 
works, allow publication of unfinished works, or permit uses of works in 
advertising can bespeak an artist’s views of himself and his own literary 
creations. Lior Strahilevitz would even extend these expressive interests 
to destructive orders by an author-testator.264 By enforcing such orders 
with respect to one’s unfinished works, he argues, a court can assist an 
author like Kafka, who “may wish to send a message to the public that 
he is not the type of artist who will tolerate, let alone publish, inferior 
works.”265 
This very self-expressiveness is arguably all the more pronounced in 
the case of Adam Yauch’s will. The handwritten nature of the 
restriction, added to the typed text, certainly suggests that this provision 
was of particular importance to Yauch.266 Arguably, these are interests 
that should be honored until copyright law no longer permits an author 
or his successors to enjoy that degree of control—that is, for seventy 
years following his death. 
Moreover, effectuating artistic control accords with the view of the 
settlor as principal267 and with certain trends in the law, as discussed 
                                                     
263. Horton, supra note 47, at 107. Horton contrasts this to John Langbein’s preferred 
characterization of settlors as “beneficiary-regarding.” Id. at 106–07; see also Langbein, Mandatory 
Rules, supra note 148, at 1112 (“Trust law’s deference to the settlor’s direction always presupposes 
that the direction is beneficiary-regarding.”); Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 
385 (same). 
264. See Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 833.  
265. Id. Strahilevitz advances several other arguments in support of a court’s enforcement of a 
destruction directive: that the foreknowledge of enforcement will serve as an ex ante incentive to 
authors to undertake “high-risk, high-reward projects”; that, as an economic matter, an author “is in 
the best position to determine which of his works should form his artistic legacy”; and finally, that 
disregarding the order would amount to compelled speech, with possible First Amendment 
implications. Id. at 830–35. 
266. New York, it should be noted, is particularly rigid when it comes to adherence to 
testamentary formalities, and so, as an initial matter, Yauch’s handwriting on the will raised 
questions. Under black letter law, no effect could be given to writing—including attempted 
amendments to the text—added after execution of the will. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-
2.1(a)(1)(B) (2010) (“No effect shall be given . . . to any matter preceding such signature which was 
added subsequently to the execution of the will.”). Any such attempts would simply be disregarded. 
For that reason, the drafting attorney testified that Yauch’s handwritten words were inserted prior to 
the execution of the will, Attorney Affidavit, In re Will of Yauch, No. 2012/2934 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 
Aug. 8, 2012)—a representation that the probate court accepted, Decree Granting Probate, In re 
Will of Yauch, No. 2012/2934 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. Sept. 27, 2012). It is possible, however, that had the 
Surrogate’s Court not accepted this proffered explanation, Yauch’s alteration nevertheless would 
have been accepted because it was initialed by Yauch and his three witnesses. See N.Y. EST. 
POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-4.1(a)(1)(B) (2010); In re Will of Litwack, 827 N.Y.S.2d 582, 583–84 
(Surr. Ct. 2006). 
267. See supra notes 230–31 and accompanying text (describing view of Sitkoff). 
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above.268 The increasing opportunity to dictate property distributions 
perpetually, to graft explicit conditions affecting highly personal choices 
onto a trust instrument, and to have one’s wishes voluntarily carried out 
by a donee even where basic trust requirements have not been met all 
seem to indicate an enhanced tolerance by society for dead-hand control. 
It is also less costly, from a certain perspective, for fiduciaries to simply 
follow the instructions they are given rather than engage in a searching 
inquiry about what to do.269 
Furthermore, certain kinds of instructions, such as a thoughtfully 
constructed moratorium on access or publication (to protect privacy 
interests of the still living) or a direction that certain parties consult with 
one another, seem reasonable. At the very least, it is hard to argue that 
such light-touch artistic restrictions are capricious or wasteful such that 
they should be stricken as socially harmful.270 Importantly, these sorts of 
restrictions do not deny living successors the opportunity to make 
decisions about the exploitation of works—or at least not for too long, if 
the moratorium is reasonable in length. And without such enforcement, 
authors may well destroy works themselves.271 
Milder forms of artistic control also square with the sorts of 
instructions that courts typically enforce in this arena. By way of 
context, courts in the past did take a dim view of testators’ pet projects 
they deemed too eccentric. In a number of cases, decedent authors left 
money in trust for the purpose of having a trustee or executor publish 
and circulate their writings. For example, in Wilber v. Asbury Park 
National Bank & Trust Co.,272 the testator instructed in his will that 
$15,000 be expended to type, edit, and distribute his manuscript, 
“Random Scientific Notes Seeking the Essentials in Place and Space.”273 
The court refused to permit the executor to do so, finding the writings 
“irrational, unintelligible, and of no scientific or other value,” and that 
their distribution would be “a waste of money.”274 
                                                     
268. See supra section II.C.1. 
269. Cooper, supra note 184, at 1182–83. 
270. See discussion infra at notes 292–98 and accompanying text. 
271. Cf. Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Property, and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
675, 706 (1993) (“[T]he threat that copyright would not protect creations from being used in 
foreseen but unintended ways could discourage creative effort.”). 
272. 59 A.2d 570 (N.J. Ch. 1948), aff’d sub nom. Wilber v. Owens, 65 A.2d 843 (N.J. 1949). 
273. Id. at 572.  
274. Id. at 578–79. The court did, however, find evidence of a general charitable intent—to 
advance education, id. at 583–84—which enabled it to apply the cy pres doctrine and direct the 
money, in trust, to Princeton University. Id. at 584–86. In another older case, the court found that a 
trust had been created, but it was evidently too put off by the decedent’s works to hold it charitable 
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More recently, however, in Rosser v. Prem,275 a court upheld a 
bequest that created a trust for the purpose of publishing the testator’s 
book, entitled Linda, which dealt with the death of her daughter from 
cancer at a young age.276 In response to the charge that Linda was 
“worthless,”277 the court held that the purpose of addressing a topic such 
as bereavement was acceptable and that the court was not supposed to 
“review it as might a critic for The New York Times Book Review.”278 
A final, perhaps surprising, reason to enforce particularized 
instructions—from the perspective of society—is that such enforcement 
would also logically extend to instructions by authors that their 
successors deal liberally with their works. For example, an author might 
be particularly inclined to support educational uses of her works. On that 
basis, authors could theoretically instruct their fiduciaries to allow all 
educational or scholarly uses of their works without payment along the 
lines Kurt Vonnegut attempted through his get-out-of-litigation-free 
letter.279 “Here, paradoxically, the dead hand’s clasp can play a 
constructive role by refusing to yield to the narrow interests of 
subsequent living hands.”280 If all authorial instructions were deemed 
unenforceable, then such instructions would fail too. 
B. Reasons to Deny Postmortem Artistic Control 
There are many reasons to put one’s copyright interests into a trust. 
Primary among such reasons is the ability to consolidate the strands of a 
copyright in one place—and in the hands of a trusted manager—while 
still benefiting multiple beneficiaries.281 But conveying one’s wishes to a 
trustee (or executor) about how and when to license adaptations, for 
example, is a different proposition from creating an enforceable duty in 
that regard. There are limits on the duties that one can impose upon a 
fiduciary. As John Langbein points out, there is no obligation to transfer 
                                                     
or honorary in nature. See Fidelity Title & Trust Co. v. Clyde, 121 A.2d 625, 629 (Conn. 1956) 
(“[A] reading of the article which [the testator] called ‘Prenatal Psychisms and Mystical Pantheism’ 
is a truly nauseating experience in the field of pornography. The trust is invalid as being contrary to 
public policy.”). 
275. 449 A.2d 461 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1982). 
276. Id. at 461–62. 
277. Id. at 468–69. 
278. Id. at 470–71 (holding the “trust created by [testator’s] will is charitable and capable of 
being carried out by the trustee”). 
279. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
280. Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 51–52 (emphasis in original). 
281. See Tritt, supra note 46, at 172 n.298.  
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property using a trust.282 But a “transferor who chooses to use the trust 
form . . . must accept that minimum regime of fiduciary obligation that 
defines a trust.”283 And, as discussed, fiduciary obligations are also 
incumbent upon executors.284 
Many of the authorial restrictions outlined above285 raise the types of 
red flags that justify interference with testamentary intent. For example, 
prohibitions on publication, on the creation of adaptations, on 
advertising uses, or on exploitation within geographic areas, or 
instructions requiring the destruction of works, are the sorts of use 
restrictions that have the potential to “clog[] alienability”286 and 
“directly impair the value of property,”287 causing harm to society as a 
whole.288 It is hard to argue that instructions such as these are capricious, 
exactly,289 because authors who specify very particular treatments of 
their work are often clear-headed, if passionate, when formulating their 
prescriptions.290 Yet, the ordered destruction of works or total ban on 
certain uses bespeaks the type of waste that has prevented courts from 
enforcing instructions in other settings.291 
The leading case is Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.,292 in which the 
testator directed her executor to raze her home, sell the land, and transfer 
the proceeds to her residuary beneficiaries.293 Refusing to enforce the 
                                                     
282. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 380. 
283. Id.; see also id. at 382–83. 
284. See supra section I.E. 
285. See supra section I.D. 
286. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 128, at 22.  
287. See id. at 50.  
288. See supra notes 154–57 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch and Wang). 
Indeed, these sorts of instructions may constitute a counterexample to Hirsch’s separately 
articulated claim that bequests for purposes often “enhance the value of property in the testator’s 
hands without compromising . . . the efficiency of the use of resources.” Hirsch, supra note 115, at 
68. 
289. As the Restatement puts it: 
A clear line cannot be drawn . . . between objectives that are capricious—or ‘frivolous’ or 
‘whimsical’—and those that are not. A purpose is not capricious merely because no living 
person benefits directly from its performance, if it satisfies a desire that many (even if not 
most) people have with respect to the disposition of their property . . . .  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003); cf. Cooper, supra note 184, 
at 1169–70; Cooper, supra note 182, at 2397. 
290. See, e.g., KUNDERA, supra note 253, at 258 (disputing the notion that “wanting to destroy 
one’s own work is a pathological act”). 
291. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 115, at 83 (“Courts should overturn bequests for purposes when 
they tend to the injury of society.”). 
292. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). 
293. Id. at 211. 
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provision on public policy grounds,294 the court noted that this was not a 
situation in which the testator had attempted to make a specific, if 
idiosyncratic, gift of property; rather, the gift she had apparently wanted 
to convey was one of cash.295 Because the enforcement of the will would 
have wreaked harm upon the testator’s neighbors and the public, and 
actually would have resulted in fewer funds for her residuary 
beneficiaries, the court refused to enforce the terms of the will.296 This 
was so even though the court acknowledged that the testator would have 
been freer to destroy her home while alive.297 In short, these restrictions 
seemed designed to benefit no one and yet were harmful to all 
involved.298 
It is true that other courts have on rare occasion enforced equivalent 
destructive instructions.299 In National City Bank v. Case Western 
Reserve University,300 for example, the court found that the testator’s 
instructions to her executors—to raze her house and to sell the land—
were not “repugnant, contrary to public policy, nor capricious” because 
they reflected her concerns about the changing nature of her 
neighborhood from residential to commercial and her desire to have her 
home remain residential.301 But, rather than actually ordering 
compliance with these instructions, the court authorized the executors to 
sell the house to an historical society with a restrictive covenant 
preventing the house’s use for commercial purposes.302 
Aggressive artistic control measures may also create the problems 
associated with investment restrictions.303 Sentencing a work to remain 
exclusively in one medium or prohibiting advertising uses for the 
duration of the copyright term prevents fiduciaries from taking 
                                                     
294. Id. at 217. 
295. See id. at 212. 
296. Id. at 214. 
297. See id. at 214–15. The intuition is that the instinct to preserve property while one is alive 
normally counteracts such eccentric behavior. Id. at 215; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS 
§ 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003) (“Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property, 
self-interest ordinarily restrains such conduct.”). 
298. Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 217; accord In re Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492–93 (Surr. 
Ct. 1977) (invalidating instruction directing trustee to demolish two houses on public policy 
grounds).  
299. See, e.g., In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Surr. Ct. 1998) (declining to vitiate 
testamentary instruction based on “anemic” public policy grounds). 
300. 369 N.E.2d 814 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1976). 
301. Id. at 818–19. 
302. Id. at 819.  
303. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (describing view of Hirsch and Wang). 
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advantage of remunerative investment opportunities that may present 
themselves down the road. Authors, like other testators, draft their 
testamentary instructions with imperfect information and in 
circumstances that can change after their deaths.304 Artistic restrictions 
therefore may also fail to accommodate the need to adjust investment 
strategy should the beneficiaries require an influx of funds for problems 
that arise after the author’s death, such as health issues. Likewise, a ban 
on publication of works that are embodied in a single or limited number 
of physical copies runs the risk that valuable manuscripts, notebooks, 
and canvases could become inadvertently destroyed, damaged, or lost, 
depleting their value to the beneficiaries and society at large. For all of 
these reasons, enforcement of such provisions could violate the benefit-
the-beneficiaries principle that has gained traction in recent years.305 
As described earlier, the modern portfolio theory basically instructs 
that a prudent investor should diversify investments.306 To the extent that 
a fiduciary adheres to the rigid restrictions imposed by an author to keep 
works cloistered, that action would seem to violate the spirit, if not the 
letter, of the modern portfolio theory. It is true that this requirement is a 
default rule that can be overridden with proper drafting.307 Trustees can, 
and should, consider an “asset’s special relationship or special value, if 
any, to the purposes of the trust or to one or more of the 
                                                     
304. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text (describing view of Langbein). 
305.  See supra notes 176–81, 245–49 and accompanying text. An issue that may readily present 
itself is that such restraints may hamstring successors from paying off any estate tax liability, which 
is based upon the author’s gross estate regardless of the artistic restrictions imposed. See Revenue 
Act of 1962, 26 U.S.C. § 2033 (2012) (“The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all 
property to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death.”); Goffe, supra 
note 7. There has been a robust discussion in the literature on this point with respect to the estate tax 
consequences of rights of publicity that successors do not plan to exploit. See, e.g., Joshua C. Tate, 
Immortal Fame: Publicity Rights, Taxation, and the Power of Testation, 44 GA. L. REV. 1, 7–9 
(2009) (discussing the debate and collecting sources). 
306. See supra notes 179–81and accompanying text. A classic case illustrating this principle is In 
re Estate of Janes, 681 N.E.2d 332 (N.Y. 1997). In that case, former state senator Rodney Janes was 
survived by his seventy-two year old wife. Id. at 334. At his death in 1973, his $3.5 million estate 
was heavily invested in Kodak stock. Id. (Janes had represented the Rochester area and therefore 
may have attached sentimental, in addition to financial, value to his Kodak holdings. See 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 43, at 626 n.62.) The stock, consisting of 13,232 shares, had a 
date-of-death value of $135 per share, totaling roughly $1.8 million. Janes, 681 N.E.2d at 334. By 
1980, with only about 2,000 shares sold, the share price had fallen to approximately $47 and the 
remaining shares were worth $530,000. Id. at 335. The New York Court of Appeals held that the 
trustees had violated their duty of prudence by failing to diversify the trust holdings. Id. at 338–39. 
307. E.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 11-2.3(a), (b)(3)(C) (2010); UNIF. PRUDENT 
INV’R ACT § 1(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1995); accord Cooper, supra note 184, at 1180; Langbein, 
Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1112. 
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beneficiaries.”308 Such assets have typically included farmland or a 
controlling interest in a family business,309 but there is no reason why 
they could not also include copyright interests. Still, courts are wary of 
such purported dispensations, and they will typically not discharge a 
trustee from the duty to diversify without explicit authorization to that 
effect in the trust instrument.310 Furthermore, at least according to 
Langbein, the benefit-the-beneficiaries principle acts as an outer 
boundary on a settlor’s ability to depart from default rules.311 
Perhaps enforcement of aggressive authorial restrictions could 
actually be consistent with the benefit-the-beneficiaries principle: 
consider a case in which departure from the instruction would produce a 
work of such inferiority that it would cause a precipitous decline in the 
value of the trust’s other holdings, resulting in financial harm to the 
beneficiaries. In general, however, it is hard to imagine such a case. For 
example, it is nearly impossible to conjure up a scenario in which the 
trustees’ licensing of a movie version of The Catcher in the Rye yielded 
less overall value to the beneficiaries than a decision to heed Salinger’s 
(possible) wishes to restrict Catcher to book form.312 At the very least, it 
would seem reasonable to let living decision-makers conduct the 
                                                     
308. UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT, § 2(c)(8). 
309. See, e.g., In re Trust Created by Inman, 693 N.W.2d 514, 520 (Neb. 2005) (farmland); 
Wood v. U.S. Bank, 828 N.E.2d 1072, 1079 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (stock). 
310. See, e.g., McGinley v. Bank of Am., 109 P.3d 1146, 1154 (Kan. 2005) (“We . . . hold that 
through the express provisions of Article VIII.A, as drafted by [settlor’s] own counsel, she reduced 
the Bank’s responsibilities contained in the prudent investor rule . . . .”); Wood, 828 N.E.2d at 
1077–78 (deeming a general authorization to “retain any securities in the same form as when 
received” insufficient to override the normal duty to diversify). 
311. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1112; see also id. at 1114–15 (arguing that 
departure from the diversification duty is permissible when the trust is one of several for the 
beneficiaries or constitutes a tiny fraction of the funds available to them; in light of tax 
consequences; or when trust assets are being held for programmatic purposes rather than for 
financial investment). But see Cooper, supra note 184, at 1192 (arguing that the latter distinction is 
“artificial”). 
312. One counterexample that comes to mind is a counterfactual scenario in which Harper Lee 
mandated that her Go Set a Watchman manuscript never be released during her lifetime or following 
her death. If her fiduciaries ignored this instruction and published it anyway, it is at least plausible 
that the depiction of Atticus Finch espousing racist views in his later years might have reflected 
back on the idealistic picture of Atticus in To Kill a Mockingbird (1960) and weakened the demand 
for the earlier book. See generally Michiko Kakutani, Review: Harper Lee’s ‘Go Set a Watchman’ 
Gives Atticus Finch a Dark Side, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/07/11/books/review-harper-lees-go-set-a-watchman-gives-atticus-finch-a-dark-side.html 
[https://perma.cc/BT4Y-LX5D]. 
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cost/benefit analysis of whether to go ahead with the particular 
adaptation.313 
Regulating aggressive artistic instructions can often be squared with 
the ex ante approach favored by Daniel Kelly because in many (if not 
all) cases, deviation from the author’s instructions could be premised 
upon imperfect information, negative externalities, or intergenerational 
equity concerns.314 That is, by prohibiting for long stretches of time uses 
of expressive works that the living do not themselves object to, an author 
can cause harm to her beneficiaries or members of society. 
Intergenerational equity problems may also arise. Consider a case like 
that of Thomas Bernhard, who attempted to ban the publication and 
performance of his work in Austria.315 Had his instruction been 
enforced, it would have greatly reduced future generations’ access to his 
work. This is because, by curtailing the access of those members of 
current generations with the greatest likelihood of interest in his work, 
his restrictions might have relegated his work to obscurity by the time 
the copyright expired.316 In these respects, despite the legally recognized 
importance of postmortem copyright interests, the degree of conflict 
between the needs of the living and the dead may be significant.317 
Indeed, these conflicts suggest the legitimacy of intervening not only 
when a substantial period of time has passed318 but even when the 
author’s death—and social interest in the work—is fresh. 
Trends toward easier modification and termination of trusts are also 
relevant here. As mentioned, trusts traditionally could not be amended if 
such action would frustrate a material purpose of the settlor, even if all 
                                                     
313. As John Langbein puts it, in the example of the instructions issued by the former IBM 
employee, to adhere to those stock retention instructions would not be rational:  
It presupposes that a now-deceased former employee of IBM (an immense, publicly-traded 
company, which is followed by dozens of professional securities analysts, and which operates 
in rapidly changing technology-based fields) possesses material information or insight of 
enduring value that the securities markets have mispriced.  
Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt?, supra note 178, at 392; cf. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 85 
(“Knowledge of society and its culture is what makes bequests for social purposes judicious; and 
this too is bound to erode as time wears on. In due course, a bequest for a social purpose may grow 
archaic, betraying a sort of moral eccentricity.”). 
314. See supra notes 169–75 and 191–92 and accompanying text (describing view of Kelly). 
315. See supra notes 101–05 and accompanying text.  
316. Cf. Desai, supra note 17, at 264–68 (drawing upon intergenerational equity concerns to 
argue against a system of postmortem copyrights); see generally Michael J. Madison, Knowledge 
Curation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1957 (2011).  
317. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text (describing view of Smolensky). 
318. See supra notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
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of the beneficiaries consented.319 More recently, as discussed,320 there 
has been a movement toward greater leeway for change. In some cases, 
all the beneficiaries may consent to a modification of the author’s 
instructions. In such cases, courts may modify the terms as long as that 
action would not be “inconsistent with a material purpose of the 
trust.”321 Admittedly, however, an author’s instruction may well be a 
“material” element of the trust and therefore an insurmountable hurdle 
under the UTC. 
But modification may still be possible. As noted, the Restatement 
(Third) of Trusts further loosens the UTC’s approach in allowing a court 
to modify if “it determines that the reason(s) for termination or 
modification outweigh the material purpose.”322 This would permit a 
court to balance the needs of the living against those of the dead. Even 
under the UTC’s approach, modification may still be available. 
Specifically, under equitable deviation principles, courts “may modify 
the administrative or dispositive terms of a trust . . . if, because of 
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification . . . will further 
the purposes of the trust.”323 
In many cases, as mentioned, the unanticipated needs of the 
beneficiaries to exploit copyrights—or of users to access or make use of 
copyrighted works—with freer range may justify an amendment to the 
terms of the trust. Furthermore, such adjustment could also “further the 
purposes of the trust”324 if it enhances both the economic returns to the 
beneficiaries (whose welfare the author presumably cared greatly about) 
and the author’s artistic legacy. The changes should, of course, “be made 
in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention”325 to the greatest 
extent possible. So, for example, if it was clear that the author wished to 
prohibit all adaptations to other media, but was particularly concerned 
about film adaptations, a court could require fiduciaries to be more 
searching in the case of a proposed film adaptation.326 
                                                     
319. See supra notes 228–29 and accompanying text. 
320. See supra notes 232–43 and accompanying text. 
321. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 411(b) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000). 
322. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTs § 65 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).  
323. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(a). 
324. Id. 
325. Id. 
326. In addition, it seems likely that authorial instructions would be characterized as 
administrative, rather than dispositive, in nature. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 66 cmt. b 
(2003). If so, they could also be adjusted under the UTC provision that a “court may modify the 
administrative terms of a trust if continuation of the trust on its existing terms would be 
impracticable or wasteful or impair the trust’s administration.” UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412(b).  
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C. Federal Copyright Policy Disfavors Such Control 
What should tip the balance for courts and fiduciaries faced with 
these dilemmas? Gareth Jones, in his classic essay, argued that “[p]ublic 
policy is an ‘unruly horse’” and that “courts should hesitate to extend the 
boundaries of public policy in order to strike down restraints [in trusts] 
which they deem to be offensive.”327 But public policy guided by federal 
copyright policy is a different story. Copyright policy provides a highly 
relevant boundary line. 
While an in-depth exegesis of the various justifications for federal 
copyright policy is beyond the scope of this Article,328 there are, in brief, 
utilitarian, natural rights, and personhood theories.329 It is generally 
agreed, however, that the overall goal of copyright law is to maximize 
the storehouse of human knowledge by providing limited exclusive 
rights to authors.330 As will be shown in this section, permitting authors 
to dictate the uses of their works from beyond the grave generally runs 
counter to that goal. For this reason, federal copyright policy should 
weigh against the enforcement of post-death instructions in situations in 
which authors seek to bar entire categories of uses of their works and in 
which, on balance, enforcement is likely not needed to prevent the 
premature destruction of works by an author. 
Under a utilitarian approach, it is of course conceivable that 
foreknowledge that one can control his or her works after death serves as 
an upfront incentive to creation. (Indeed, the very term—life of the 
author plus seventy years—might serve as a structural incentive to this 
effect.331) While it is impossible to know how widespread such a 
sentiment might be, it is likely to be weak as a driving force given how 
few authors, relatively speaking, seek to impose the sorts of restraints 
discussed in this Article. In addition, while the proposition that would-be 
authors are inspired to create by the prospect of providing for multiple 
                                                     
327. Jones, supra note 208, at 128–29. 
328. Such discussion can readily be found elsewhere. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD 
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 37–70 (2003); Justin 
Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring 
the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517 (1990). 
329. E.g., ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY 
APPROACH 8–13, 20–22 (2012). 
330. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the 
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement 
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of 
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’”). 
331. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
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generations of loved ones is consistent with copyright as an economic 
driver,332 the same cannot be said of the present context. For here, 
authors often seek to wield their copyrights not as a potential means to 
provide for their successors, but as a tool to control the exploitation of 
their works after death—and in some instances, to deprive successors of 
monetary returns. Such attempts are not in line with accepted copyright 
principles but are more reflective of moral rights, which are distinctly 
downplayed in American copyright law.333 
If one does not focus on the point of creation, but rather on the 
downstream treatment of works already created, the utilitarian 
calculation weighs even more heavily in favor of regulating dead-hand 
control—in most cases. Even if one accepts the economic efficiencies 
entailed by having one clear right holder owning and managing an 
asset,334 those efficiencies—as they pertain to that right holder—end 
when the right holder dies. There is no reason to think that a dead author 
is in a better position to track a work’s success in the marketplace and 
ensure its place in history than are the living.335 Anthony Reese has 
pointed out, with respect to cultural preservation goals, that  
[p]erhaps most importantly, copyright law has promoted the 
production and circulation of copies of copyrighted works. . . . It 
turns out that distributing a work in multiple copies to a variety 
of owners can be one of the best mechanisms to help ensure that 
the work will survive into the future.336  
By contrast, an author’s stringent controls on access and use of 
copyrighted materials can sound a death knell for a work. 
There are, however, utilitarian reasons to enforce some strains of 
dead-hand control. Provisions that appear to be aimed at protecting 
                                                     
332.  See Subotnik, supra note 17, at 99–103 (arguing that the desire to provide financially for 
generations of one’s loved ones is compatible with longstanding intuitions that permeate succession 
law more generally). 
333. E.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the 
Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1992–93 (2006); Carl H. Settlemyer III, Note, 
Between Thought and Possession: Artists’ “Moral Rights” and Public Access to Creative Works, 81 
GEO. L.J. 2291, 2306 (1993). Indeed, the primary exception to this characterization is the Visual 
Artists Rights Act of 1990, 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012), which does afford certain authors rights to 
claim authorship of, and to prevent the intentional distortion or mutilation of, works of visual art. 
See id. § 106A(a). However, these moral rights are available only for the life of the author (in the 
case of newly created works). Id. § 106A(d)(1). 
334. E.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 471, 475 (2003).  
335. See supra note 313 and accompanying text. 
336.  R. Anthony Reese, What Copyright Owes the Future, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 287, 296–97 
(2012). 
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privacy interests, as seen in Willa Cather’s, James Merrill’s, and 
Maurice Sendak’s wills (and those of so many others), likely reflect 
heartfelt sentiment on the part of the decedent.337 While copyright law 
may not have incentivized the creation of letters or analogous personal 
documents,338 society has an interest in preserving many of these items. 
If an author feels uncertain about her ability to protect the privacy 
interests of herself or other individuals mentioned therein, she may well 
destroy the works rather than take a chance on controlled release.339 
Such permanent destruction can harm cultural preservation goals,340 
even if copyright policy does not formally extend to privacy-protecting 
purposes.341 This is why, as stated at the outset, copyright policy is 
consistent with enforcing authorial instructions such as reasonable 
moratoria on access or publication—that is, in contexts in which it is 
likely that, without such enforcement, authors would destroy their own 
works. 
Turning to other justifications for copyright, while society accepts an 
author’s ability to clamp down on uses of her works during her own 
lifetime through the exercise of copyrights, it does so over the grave 
reservations of many. But at least with respect to living authors, there are 
potentially compensating benefits to ease those reservations. Natural 
rights and personhood theories counsel in favor of a large measure of 
respect for an author’s wishes because it was, after all, the author herself 
who labored on and invested her person into the work.342 Support for 
those theories may in turn encourage more creativity in the first place.343 
Furthermore, there is a plausible basis for extending natural rights and 
personhood justifications for copyright to the upholding of an author’s 
                                                     
337. See supra section I.D. 
338. See, e.g., Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1117 
(1990) (discussing “writings prepared for private motives”). 
339. See SAX, supra note 19, at 47; Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 846, 849; Settlemyer, supra 
note 333, at 2293 n.10, 2342 n.229. 
340. On these goals, see generally Madison, supra note 316, and Reese, supra note 336. 
341. See generally Deidré A. Keller, Copyright to the Rescue: Should Copyright Protect 
Privacy?, 20 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1 (2016). 
342. A postmodernist critique might, of course, take issue with this description. And, in any 
event, fair use remains an outlet regardless of the author’s wishes. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
343. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. 
REV. 1745 (2012) (arguing that personhood-regarding aspects of intellectual property law can be 
reconciled with utilitarian aspects); cf. Settlemyer, supra note 333, at 2292, 2293 n.10 (arguing that 
an author’s right to suppress her work while alive because of privacy concerns advances copyright’s 
distributional goals). 
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choice of successor.344 But those justifications are on much shakier 
ground when it comes not merely to enforcing a choice of successor but 
specifications as to how living successors may exercise their inherited 
rights.345 
Additional facets of copyright policy both downplay the notion that 
the author occupies a privileged perch with respect to postmortem 
decision-making and emphasize the role of the living on that front. First, 
the copyright termination provision deprives the author of the right to 
select her post-death terminating agents and instead supplies a list of 
statutory heirs to perform that function.346 Because the exercise of 
termination rights has the potential to adjust the exploitation and 
visibility of the work in the marketplace, the dethroning of the author in 
this context is quite remarkable and telling. 
Second, the well-recognized “orphan works” problem reflects the 
need for more unfettered use by the living. “Works are said to be 
‘orphans’ when a prospective user has made a diligent, but unsuccessful, 
search to identify and locate the copyright owner.”347 Describing the 
many ways in which orphan works can stymie “important, productive 
projects, many of which would be beneficial to our national heritage,” 
former Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters stated the following: 
The Copyright Office finds such loss difficult to justify when the 
primary rationale behind the prohibition is to protect a copyright 
owner who is missing. If there is no copyright owner, there is no 
beneficiary of the copyright term and it is an enormous potential 
waste. The outcome does not further the objectives of the 
copyright system.348 
While congressional action to address the orphan works problem has 
yet come to fruition, this statement of policy could be applied to the 
problem addressed in this Article. Specifically, when authors place 
fundamental uses of copyrighted materials out of reach for any living 
                                                     
344. See Subotnik, supra note 17, at 109–10, 113–16. 
345. Cf. Desai, supra note 17, at 244–54 (arguing against natural rights and personhood bases for 
system of postmortem copyrights); Kwall, supra note 333, at 2003 (proposing a system of moral 
rights “limited to the life of the author”). 
346. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 203. This is generally the case unless the author dies without a 
spouse, child, or grandchild alive at the vesting period. See id. § 203(a)(2)(D). 
347. Pamela Samuelson, Notice Failures Arising from Copyright Duration Rules, 96 B.U. L. 
REV. 667, 680 (2016). 
348. See, e.g., Promoting the Use of Orphan Works: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the 
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 18, 19–20 (2008) 
(prepared statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights), 
http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-hearing-3-10-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9RR-KEF8].  
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user following their deaths, they have effectively created a problem akin 
to the orphan works problem. They have made a living rights holder 
non-locatable by being non-existent. Put another way, they create a one-
way system in which rights holders can never license, but only sue. For 
that reason, an author’s attempts, while alive, to subject her copyrights to 
similarly stringent constraints—such as by transferring them into a 
highly inflexible irrevocable trust—should likewise be frowned upon.349 
Federal copyright laws can direct the interpretation of state law 
instruments when they run counter to federal policies. In some cases 
preemption by the federal statute is explicit. For example, “an agreement 
to make a will or to make any future grant” will not constitute a valid 
waiver of copyright termination rights.350 Even where the statute is not 
explicit, federal policies play a role. For example, a license by one co-
owner of copyright that purports to be exclusive will be deemed non-
exclusive as to the other co-owners by virtue of federal law unless the 
other co-owners have agreed.351 On the patent side, the Supreme Court 
recently affirmed a judge-made rule rendering a contract unenforceable 
that provided for the payment of patent royalties following the end of the 
patent term.352 While recognizing the impaired right to freedom of 
contract that its rule entailed,353 the Court upheld a policy view that 
“when the patent expires, the patentee’s prerogatives expire too, and the 
right to make or use the article, free from all restriction, passes to the 
public.”354 
In short, copyright policy should be interpreted to provide that, to the 
greatest extent possible, the living make decisions about the fate of 
copyrighted works. Importantly, this means that living users should be 
able to rely upon fair use no matter what instructions an author has 
                                                     
349. See infra section III.D.4. Of course, if a trust were given flexibility to address unanticipated 
circumstances, it could actually serve as a solution to the orphan works problem by consolidating 
the copyright interests in one place. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. Many thanks to 
Thomas Simmons for emphasizing this latter point. 
350. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(5). 
351. See, e.g., Corbello v. DeVito, 777 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2015) (noting that a “third party 
[licensee]’s right is ‘exclusive’ as to the assigning or licensing co-owner, but not as to the other co-
owners and their assignees or licensees” unless the co-owners have consented); Davis v. Blige, 505 
F.3d 90, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Accordingly, a co-owner cannot unilaterally grant an exclusive 
license.”). 
352. Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2406 (2015). 
353. Id. at 2408. 
354. Id. at 2407. It must be acknowledged that in upholding the rule from Brulotte v. Thys Co., 
379 U.S. 29 (1964), the Court’s driving concern in Kimble appeared to be stare decisis rather than 
patent policy. See Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2406. 
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imposed.355 It also means that copyright policy should weigh against the 
enforcement of post-death instructions in situations where authors seek 
to bar entire categories of uses of their works and where, on balance, 
enforcement is not likely to be needed to prevent the premature 
destruction of work by the author. Under this view, reasonable moratoria 
on access or publication, or required consultations by particular parties 
as to contemplated uses, would be consistent with copyright policy. By 
contrast, the enforcement of total prohibitions on publication, on the 
creation of adaptations, on advertising uses,356 or on exploitation within 
geographic areas would not be consistent with federal copyright policy. 
Nor would the enforcement of instructions requiring the destruction of 
physical works that embody the only copies of the intangible work of 
authorship. 
D. Handling Particular Kinds of Instructions 
In this final section, I suggest steps for dealing with stringent 
authorial instructions—that is, where authors seek to bar entire 
categories of uses of their works and where, on balance, enforcement 
does not appear needed to protect against the premature destruction of 
the work by an author. With respect to the latter consideration, one 
would expect that authors would more readily destroy letters and diaries 
in the face of anticipated non-enforcement by fiduciaries. By contrast, it 
seems less likely that they would destroy manuscripts or unfinished 
canvases in such circumstances.357 While case law development by the 
courts will be needed to craft workable operating rules, the framework 
offered here should not open the floodgates to expensive litigation. After 
                                                     
355.  Kate O’Neill argues that, to the extent J.D. Salinger’s trustees “feel legally or emotionally 
obligated to enact Salinger’s preferences” by filing “copyright infringements to suppress works that 
are critical or disrespectful of Salinger or his work,” their “fiduciary obligations ought not to trump 
a user’s legitimate fair use defense.” O’Neill, supra note 116, at 37. This is almost certainly correct 
in view of the supremacy of federal law. 
356. One might question whether permitting advertising uses “promote[s] the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts,” the goals of the copyright system. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This is a fair point. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict the ways in which uses of works contribute to the development 
of knowledge and culture. Cf. Eva E. Subotnik, Intent in Fair Use, 18 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 935, 
936 (2014) (discussing this leap of faith made by the copyright system). Use in advertising is one 
possible way. 
357. But see POSNER, supra note 127, at 716 (“[O]ne reason to think [that postmortem artistic 
control] should be obeyed is that otherwise authors might destroy their [unpublished] manuscripts 
prematurely.”). 
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all, it is only the rare breed of author who seeks to exert strong artistic 
control after death.358 
1. Fiduciary Intends to Comply 
A fiduciary is a living person, so the concerns driving this Article are 
not strictly speaking triggered when an executor or trustee affirmatively 
seeks to adhere to an author’s instructions. It should be recalled, 
however, that a fiduciary can be prevented from carrying out whimsical 
or wasteful commands.359 As argued above, however, it is probably only 
in very unusual cases that authorial instructions could fairly be described 
as sufficiently capricious.360 It is more likely that the allegation would be 
waste. In such cases, the fiduciary could be liable for a breach of duty to 
the beneficiaries for carrying out the author’s instructions without prior 
court authorization.361 
Therefore, if the executor or trustee plans to execute the author’s 
instructions, courts should entertain lawsuits by the beneficiaries to 
modify the restrictions. Such lawsuits are particularly relevant in the 
case of instructions that proscribe uses of works, like adaptive uses or 
uses in particular contexts (such as in advertising or in certain 
geographical places), or that order the destruction of works embodying 
the sole tangible copy of the intangible expressive work. The fiduciary 
should then be obligated to demonstrate that the benefits flowing from 
adherence to the instructions outweigh the financial harms to the 
complaining beneficiaries.362 One possible way to make this 
                                                     
358. Although, as mentioned in the Introduction, as authors become increasingly sophisticated 
about their intellectual property assets, there is reason to suppose that this sort of attempted control 
will become more frequent. 
359. See, e.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (“To 
allow an executor to exercise such power stemming from apparent whim and caprice of the testatrix 
contravenes public policy.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. e (AM. LAW 
INST. 2003) (noting that, “in a trust that has definite or ascertainable beneficiaries, a provision 
intended to allow property to be used for a capricious purpose is to that extent invalid”). The 
existence of capricious provisions would therefore not compromise the validity of the entire trust; 
rather, just those provisions would be unenforceable. Id.; see also id. § 76 cmt. b(1) (2007). 
360. See supra notes 289–91 and accompanying text. 
361. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1116–17 (“In the event that the trustee 
determines that the direction to retain the asset is not in the interests of the beneficiaries, the trustee 
has a duty to resist the direction. If the trustee adheres to the trust term in such circumstances, the 
trustee risks liability to the beneficiaries for breach of trust.”). 
362. For example, consider once again the counterfactual scenario raised in note 312, supra, in 
which Harper Lee mandated that her Go Set a Watchman manuscript never be released during her 
lifetime or following her death. If we adjust the example and this time imagine that her fiduciaries 
seek to uphold the instruction and refuse publication, they might argue that the depiction of Atticus 
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demonstration is to identify at least one beneficiary who steadfastly 
wishes to heed the author’s instructions. For, as Eric Rakowski notes, “a 
person’s relatives or friends may derive satisfaction from observing his 
wishes once he is dead.”363 
2. Fiduciary Does Not Intend to Comply 
If the fiduciary seeks to depart from the author’s instructions—
presumably out of a concern that adhering to the instructions would 
result in a breach of his or her duties,364 or out of a meta-level 
appreciation of the social consequences of adherence—the fiduciary 
should apply to a court for guidance, and courts should be lenient in 
permitting modification.365 Copyright’s goals are particularly relevant 
here because the living legal owner of the interests is being prevented 
from exploiting them fully. (These goals should also weigh in the 
balance in assessing the fiduciary’s failure to pursue lawsuits against 
those who breach the author’s stated wishes.) If the beneficiaries 
themselves feel some loyalty to the deceased author’s wishes, that 
should be taken into account.366 The more likely scenario, of course, is 
collusion between the fiduciary and the beneficiaries to sidestep the 
author’s instructions without the blessing of a court.367 Advocates for 
authors’ rights in this area have voiced this particular concern.368 While 
one is sympathetic to the living author who hopes to assemble 
stakeholders to stand up for her wishes after her death, this possibility of 
                                                     
Finch espousing racist views would depress the demand for To Kill a Mockingbird and that Go Set a 
Watchman should therefore not be released. 
363. Rakowski, supra note 152, at 101. 
364. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 cmt. b(1) (2007) (“Because of this combination of 
duties, the fiduciary duties of trusteeship sometimes override or limit the effect of a trustee’s duty to 
comply with trust provisions . . . .”); see also id. § 66(2) (2003). 
365. Langbein, Mandatory Rules, supra note 148, at 1117 (“Procedurally, the appropriate step 
would be for the trustee to petition the court to modify the direction, consistent with the benefit-the-
beneficiaries standard.”). 
366. Cf. Cohen, supra note 71, at 14 (“Could Kafka’s heirs (assuming a proper will) have 
required Brod to burn Kafka’s works immediately after his death, or would Brod’s unequivocal 
opinion have sufficed to convince the court that these indeed were an asset whose destruction would 
be immoral because of their cultural value (which would be revealed to the entire world only 
afterwards)?”). 
367. Adam Hirsch has noted this possibility in the context of honorary trusts. See Hirsch, supra 
note 115, at 97. 
368. See Literary Legacies: Executors, Duty, the Law—and a Proposal, 3 COMPLETE REV. Q. 
(Nov. 2002), http://www.complete-review.com/quarterly/vol3/issue4/litlegs.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
664G-7HTR]. 
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tacit agreement among the stakeholders may simply be unavoidable as 
time passes. 
3. Author Prescribes Liberal Treatment of Works 
In contrast to the treatment of restrictive instructions, federal 
copyright policy should not put up roadblocks to authors seeking to 
dedicate their work to the public domain or to otherwise facilitate public 
access to, or use of, it. Accordingly, copyright policy should be viewed 
as consistent with attempts by authors to guarantee liberal licensing or 
unpaid uses of their works following their deaths. In many instances, 
such impulses will likely manifest themselves in the creation of 
charitable organizations to carry out these purposes. Maurice Sendak, for 
example, made clear in his will that he wanted part of his property to be 
operated by his Foundation as a museum and study center and “to be 
opened to the general public.”369 In other cases, however, an author 
might try to insist upon such treatment outside of the charitable context, 
as did Kurt Vonnegut.370 Such instructions should generally be 
upheld.371 
4. Author Attempts Equivalent Control During Life 
One theme that permeates the case law and literature in this area is 
whether the fact of a decedent’s death should matter to the enforceability 
of her wishes regarding her property.372 If a person, while alive, can 
destroy her property, why should the law prevent her from doing so after 
her death? This line of inquiry applies equally to assessing authorial 
control over expressive works. 
Nevertheless, this Article proposes that the role of third-party 
fiduciaries should be similar whether the author is dead or alive. Imagine 
that, for some reason, an author transferred her copyrights into an 
irrevocable inter vivos trust (managed by a third-party trustee) with the 
same aggressive instructions as those discussed throughout this 
Article.373 In such a case, one might at first take the position that, by 
                                                     
369. Will of Maurice Sendak, at 4–5, ¶ 5.B.1(b) (Feb. 6, 2011). 
370. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
371. Cf. Hirsch, supra note 115, at 105 (“Yet another possibility would be to grant standing to 
persons who benefit indirectly from a purpose bequest.”). 
372. E.g., Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Hirsch, 
supra note 115, at 74–75; Jones, supra note 208, at 126; Smolensky, supra note 126, at 787; 
Strahilevitz, supra note 23, at 839–41. 
373. Such cases are likely to be extremely rare. 
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definition, a living author is a living person and so a decision to transfer 
copyright assets in this way fully constitutes a decision by the living that 
should be upheld. Furthermore, there might be a particularly compelling 
case to be made that upholding such a decision respects a living author’s 
natural rights and personhood interests in a way that distinguishes this 
context from that of a dead author.374 And yet, analogous and overriding 
policy concerns regarding the ability of subsequent rights holders to 
account for changed circumstances and to make autonomous decisions 
about the works would arise.375 Courts and fiduciaries should therefore 
enjoy equal flexibility in such cases as in postmortem cases. 
5. Subsequent Owner Issues Instructions 
The reasoning underpinning this Article’s proposal to loosen the 
enforcement of rigid instructions imposed by authors themselves applies 
a fortiori to instructions imposed by copyright successors.376 Whatever 
special relationship exists in such circumstances between owner and 
asset,377 that relationship is usually one step removed from the regime 
that led to the work’s creation. Accordingly, the costs of enforcement in 
such circumstances likely outweigh the benefits. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that, to the extent authors attempt to bind their 
successors’ ability to exploit copyright interests (or related tangible 
                                                     
374. See supra note 342 and accompanying text. 
375. One possible distinction between this context and the postmortem context exists in 
jurisdictions that permit a settlor to revoke an otherwise irrevocable trust as long as all of the 
beneficiaries consent. See, e.g., N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 7-1.9 (2010); UNIF. TRUST 
CODE § 411(a) (UNIF. LAW. COMM’N 2000). At least in theory, this ability by the living to take 
account of changed circumstances alleviates the principal concerns that animate this Article (and 
use of a revocable inter vivos trust would alleviate them entirely because a revocable trust is by its 
nature revocable by the living). 
376. To the extent that the deceased authors themselves did not prescribe the following treatment, 
these might serve as examples. See, e.g., Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 
1282 (11th Cir. 2001) (Marcus, J., concurring) (describing Margaret Mitchell estate’s objection to 
uses of Gone With The Wind that refer to miscegenation or homosexuality); Olufunmilayo B. 
Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy and Bess, and Unfair Use, 37 
RUTGERS L.J. 277, 325 (2006) (noting that “[t]he George Gershwin Trust closely controls casting of 
Porgy and Bess by stipulating that in certain performances, characters in the opera that are black 
must be cast with black singers”). 
377. Margaret Radin’s very invocation of a “portrait” as a quintessential personhood-infused 
object suggests that owners of tangible works subject to copyright may (like the authors of the 
underlying copyrighted expression) also have personal stakes in those works. See Radin, supra note 
140, at 959; see also Desai, supra note 17, at 254. 
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property), such control should largely not be enforced where authors 
have proscribed entire categories of uses and where enforcement is not 
generally needed to prevent the premature destruction of works by 
authors. Trust law principles provide flexibility on this front, and federal 
copyright policy should weigh in favor of access to, use of, and 
preservation of works for the benefit of the living. Gregory Alexander 
perhaps said it best when he linked the difficulties in confronting 
coherently these sorts of tensions to “our own ambivalent feelings about 
social versus individual control over disposition of property.”378 In some 
ways, this Article has advocated inching toward his “incremental” 
proposal that we “enrich legal doctrine by treating no single actor’s 
intent as capable of trumping the intentions of all other actors with 
respect to the disposition of a given asset.”379 The treatment of attempted 
artistic control after death offers a reasonable place to let the living have 
their say. 
 
                                                     
378. Alexander, supra note 168, at 1263. 
379. Id. at 1266. 
